Oral Answers to Questions

Gregory Campbell: Given the economic downturn and its impact, what steps can the Government take to make people even more aware of the generous tax breaks that are available to donate to charities, which in turn may enable charities to employ people to do even better the work that they do so well?

Andy Reed: Many charities, including Rainbows hospice in my constituency, have reported similar patterns of reduced corporate and personal giving while the income from charity shops has increased. At this crucial time, it is important that Departments, in particular, play their full role, with respect not just to hospices—I hope my right hon. Friend will make the case that they should be properly funded by the NHS—but to community and amateur sports clubs, on which some Government policies are having an impact, particularly water charges in some parts of the country. Will my right hon. Friend ensure that bureaucracy and added burdens on community groups in constituencies such as mine and those elsewhere across the country are reduced as quickly as possible?

Paddy Tipping: Will the Minister work to ensure that local government supports social enterprises? In particular, will he look at the example of Conservative-led Newark and Sherwood district council, who not only closed the local leisure centre at Rainworth, but whose help in taking those swimming baths forward as a social enterprise has been next to nothing?

Liam Byrne: I should put on record my thanks and congratulations to my right hon. Friend for the work that she did when she had my job in pioneering family nurse partnerships and bringing help, education, advice and support to some of the most vulnerable parents in this country and their children. This Government are proud of the fact that we have invested £25 billion in early years education. It is clear from the evidence that the more we invest wisely in our children's early years, the better their later success.  [ Interruption. ] That is why the Government are committed not, as the Opposition propose, to cutting £200 million from Sure Start, but to expanding the reach of those services in the years to come.  [ Interruption. ]

Gordon Brown: Before I list my engagements, I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in sending our profound condolences to the families and friends of the servicemen killed in Afghanistan since we last met: Serjeant Christopher Reed of 6th Battalion the Rifles, and Corporals Robert Deering and Liam Elms, Lance Corporal Ben Whatley and Marine Travis Mackin, all from the Royal Marines. Afghanistan is the front line against the Taliban. These were brave and committed men, dedicated to their country and to their colleagues, and I know that the whole House will agree with me that we owe them, and all who have lost their lives, all our gratitude for all their services. Their lives will be remembered with pride.
	This morning I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in the House, I shall have further meetings later today. I shall be meeting President Sarkozy this evening and visiting Chancellor Merkel on Thursday, and looking at what we can do to work for a ceasefire in Gaza as well as what the G20 will be able to do to deal with the global financial crisis.

Gordon Brown: We raised the pension by £60—the Conservatives opposed it. We raised child benefit from 1 January—they opposed it. We are raising tax allowances in April—they opposed it. We are investing more in the economy and they are opposing that.
	As for VAT— [Interruption.] Incidentally, it was promoted not just by us but by the former Chancellor, the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) and Lord Lamont, who said:
	"If there are to be any tax cuts, my first candidate would be VAT".
	So the Conservative party is not exactly united on that. The right hon. Gentleman may think that VAT is unimportant, but at the end of every week, the typical family has more than £5 extra in their pockets. It may not matter to the people on the Opposition Front Bench that £5 extra is in people's pockets—that is £275 a year, as a result of the cut in VAT. It is more money for everyone in the community, not just the few whom they support, and more money so that people can make choices about what they spend. If we take together all the measures that we have taken, and look at every other country in the world, we find that they want fiscal expansion and that the Conservative party is the only party that wants public spending cuts. The Conservatives are out of touch with the rest of the world; they are completely isolated.

Gordon Brown: I have just explained that the Conservative scheme is completely unfunded, and the right hon. Gentleman had better look at what he would put up to help people in this difficult situation. As far as the banks are concerned, the £10 billion is working capital that will go to firms over the course of the next year. The business guarantee scheme is to help firms that want to convert their overdrafts into loans, or that need investment capital. We will buy shares in high-technology companies that have a viable future, so that they can transfer their debt into equity. These are the things that we can do practically. Since November, 20,000 firms have already benefited from the cash-flow promises that we made in the Budget that we would give deferral of taxation to people who were facing a need for working capital or for cash flow. So, far from not taking action, 20,000 firms have already benefited.

Gordon Brown: My right hon. Friend—who is the Member of Parliament for South Swindon—is absolutely right. Two issues face the car industry at the moment. One is a shortage— [Interruption.] Opposition Members laugh when we talk about the car industry. The first issue is a shortage of demand for cars; the second is the availability of credit for people buying cars. We have been talking to the various car companies and we will make announcements in due course, but those two problems must be dealt with. In terms of the car credit problem, which relates to loans for car purchase, this is basically a market that is outside the traditional banking industry, and we must look at what we can do to prevent it from freezing in the way in which other markets have. This is a detailed and technical question about how we can get help into the car loan industry, but we are looking at it very carefully.
	Some firms in the car industry have already asked us about help with training skilled workers so that they can rebuild, and build, their skills during the period of downturn, and we are also prepared to provide that. In other words, we will do what we can to help.

Gordon Brown: I am looking forward to working with President Obama. I also pay tribute to what President Bush has done—he was the first to recognise the importance of dealing with international terrorism after 11 September 2001—but a new Administration have policies for a fiscal stimulus, and that will help Northern Ireland as well as the rest of the United Kingdom. If all the economies can work together in co-ordination, the benefit of what we do individually can be magnified a great deal.
	I believe that the work that the Obama Administration are about to do to build a stronger economy will be complemented by what we can do in Europe, and by what China and other countries can do. I believe that the consensus throughout the world will be not only that we needed to recapitalise the banks, but that we need the very fiscal stimulus that, unfortunately, Members in all parts of the House cannot support.

Kerry McCarthy: The Prime Minister may be aware that DK Eyewitness, the world's best-selling guide book publisher, recently declared Bristol one of the world's top 10 cities to visit in 2008. He is more than welcome to check out its recommendation himself whenever he wishes. More important is the fact that our city has also been shortlisted for the title of European green capital of the year, and has been voted the United Kingdom's most sustainable city. Does the Prime Minister agree with me, and with the people of Bristol, that green jobs and sustainable development are the way forward out of the present economic downturn?

Alan Duncan: May I start by asking the Minister to apologise to the House for the way in which his Department has handled this announcement? It was leaked yesterday to a BBC journalist, it was followed up with interviews on the broadcast media this morning, and it was briefed out in a press conference from the Secretary of State, yet he and his Department only intended to give a written statement to the House. That is yet another display of this Government's total disregard for proper parliamentary procedures, and Parliament will wish to express its displeasure at the contempt for it shown by Lord Mandelson.
	We have been arguing for several months now that at the heart of this current recession is the collapse of credit. Companies of all sizes are experiencing significant difficulties, either as a consequence of the actions of the banks in protecting their own balance sheets or because credit insurers are withdrawing from the marketplace and breaking the payment chain. The CBI says that businesses will face the daunting prospect of refinancing £100 billion during this year. What number would the Minister put on the collapse in the volume of credit over the last year, and how does it compare with the figures the Government have announced today?
	For the past few weeks the Conservative party has persistently called for the Government to adopt a big, bold and simple scheme which will open new channels of credit to help restore the flow of lending. Our national loans guarantee scheme would guarantee up to £50 billion of new loans to British business. It has been endorsed and supported by numerous commentators and trade bodies, but all the Government could do was rubbish it, yet now, today, they are announcing something based on it.
	Can the Minister tell us how the Government will select the small firms that are eligible for the £1 billion of longer-term loan guarantees? Secondly, will the guarantees be available to foreign firms, or just to British companies? Thirdly, on what basis will the Government decide whether to buy the shares of a company? Fourthly, following the report in  The Guardian today, will the Minister confirm that the £10 billion of guarantees for working capital will be self-financing, which is what we have argued for? Fifthly, what is there in the package for larger businesses, many of which are also our largest employers?
	Today, redundancies have been announced at Jaguar Land Rover, Barclays and other companies, particularly in the retail sector. We are facing an explosion of insolvencies. Is not the package that has been unveiled today too little, too late and too complicated? The Government have spent months grandstanding and designing publicity stunts, during which time they have done absolutely nothing to help the 6,000 small firms that the Federation of Small Businesses says have gone under while we have been waiting for action. Now, they have announced a pale imitation of our proposals, which the National Institute of Economic and Social Research has said
	"will look like another of the Government's half-measures".
	The CBI says that the scale of the problem goes
	"well beyond what the Government has announced today".
	How long must we wait for the bigger, bolder and simpler scheme that the Opposition have been proposing for months? Today, we have been given a small bandage for a massive wound to an economy that has been injured beyond measure by the irresponsibility of the Prime Minister.

Patricia Hewitt: I know that many firms in my constituency will warmly welcome today's announcement, but will my hon. Friend confirm not only that the help will be available from today but that all banks will be participating, so that we no longer have the spectacle of some fundamentally and absolutely healthy firms finding that their overdrafts are completely withdrawn or that credit lines only continue to be made available at excessive rates of interest, often with no notice at all provided by the banks to which they have been loyal customers?

Ian Pearson: As always, my right hon. Friend makes some very good points. It is important that all the major banks take part in the various schemes. We have certainly been in discussion with them all on those issues. On the issue of lending to small businesses, in particular, she will be aware of some of the decisions that were announced as a result, I believe, of Government pressure back at the end of November and early December about maintaining available lending. It is not just about the banks that take part in the recapitalisation process. The other major banks are making strong attempts to do the right thing by small businesses.
	As my right hon. Friend rightly says, there is an issue about the credit economy and about the price of credit, which is why we believe that the working capital scheme is an appropriately and effectively targeted measure that will help many businesses in this country through these difficult times. Over the next few months, businesses will be looking to renew their credit facilities. The fact that there is a Government guarantee for existing and new credit lines will, I am sure, be welcomed by companies and it should be welcomed by this House.

John Thurso: May I begin by saying that given the scale and complexity of the measures that are being proposed, it would have been far more appropriate if they had been communicated to the House in a statement on the Floor of the House? In future, if the Minister has any further such measures to announce, will he do so in the usual manner of making a statement to the House?
	Is it not the case that the core issue for the economy remains the crisis of confidence in the financial system and the consequent inability of companies to gain credit? The proposals are designed to help alleviate that problem. I would welcome any well designed or thought through proposals, but it is somewhat difficult to know whether these proposals meet that test at this time and my fear is that they do not. The root cause of the problem in the financial system remains the uncertainty about the level of toxic debt in the banking system. It is a like a gangrene in the financial body and until that gangrene has been amputated in terms of the loss of a nasty bank that uncertainty will remain. Our concern is that large liabilities will continue to be taken on by the taxpayer without proper quantification or clear strategic thinking. Do the Government not accept that such conflict is inherent in their instructions to the banks to maintain 2007 levels of credit while repairing their balance sheets? Those aims, frankly, are not compatible.
	With regard to the working capital scheme, may I ask the Minister how the Government will ensure that those funds go to companies that actually need them—to companies that would not otherwise be funded in the normal way by their banks? Is there not a danger that banks will simply use the funds to lower their risk? How is there to be a proper definition of new lending? Will it simply be new lending to an existing company that would already have had it or will it be to a company that would not have got it, and how will that be quantified?
	With regard to the enterprise finance guarantee, how will creditworthiness be rated and what will be the due diligence procedure? How will the Government ensure that finance goes to firms that need it rather than to those that would have received it anyway?
	Lastly, I am happy to give a cautious welcome to the capital enterprise fund, as I have long believed that one of the barriers to growth for small companies has been the lack of affordable capital, but how will the capital be made available? The Minister said that it will come by means of equity and that the fund will be run by professional managers, but at the core are the terms under which the equity will be acquired. What is the internal rate of return that the Government will target for those fund managers? What thought have they given to making the funds available in that way?
	Although I welcome the sentiment behind the proposals, I am unsure as to their practical effects and whether they will work. May I ask the Minister that at the earliest opportunity the House be given the chance properly to scrutinise what has been put forward and to debate it in a manner other than this?

Ian Pearson: As a Government, we are always prepared to see proper parliamentary scrutiny of Government decisions and I have no doubt that subject to issues of commercial confidentiality we shall want to make full information available.
	We believe that today's announcement is important. We have an effective package of measures that build on the work we have done so far—the recapitalising of the banks, the fiscal stimulus that has been announced and the discussions and negotiations we have had with the banks to make sure that those involved in the recapitalisation process continue to make lending available at 2007 levels, which the hon. Gentleman mentioned. All that is important. If he looks at the recent lending report produced by the Bank of England, he will see that the estimated net flow of lending to businesses for the whole of December actually picked up significantly compared with the previous month, but there are still issues, which is why the measures we have announced today are important.
	The hon. Gentleman raised the issue of whether the working capital scheme would be additional. What we are doing, on a portfolio of companies basis, is seeking to agree with the banks a package of existing and new working capital credit lines, which we will guarantee as a Government. In turn, that will free up bank capital, and we have said that as a stipulation of participating in the scheme banks must use that freed-up capital to provide additional lending to businesses. That is something that will not be proposed in the Opposition scheme and is major additionality in the programme, which will, I am sure, be welcomed by the House.
	The enterprise finance guarantee is targeted on creditworthy companies and because it is operated by the banks the process is that an individual company will apply for the scheme through its bank. Companies can get guidance from the Business Link website on how to go about the process but it will be up to the banks to apply due diligence in determining access to the scheme. I have already indicated the eligibility criteria in broad terms and more details are available.
	Lastly, the hon. Gentleman mentioned capital for enterprise and I appreciate his cautious welcome for the scheme. It is targeted on smaller companies that need an equity injection that they cannot get through other means. It will be up to professional fund managers to determine the internal rates of return they might target and that is obviously a matter to which we shall return.

Sammy Wilson: I, too, welcome the statement. The measure may be copied from the Conservative party, but that will not matter a great deal to the people who will benefit from it or to firms who find themselves in trouble because of an inability to borrow. There are three points that companies would make to me. First, any scheme should be simple, and companies should know who is and is not eligible. Secondly, it should be speedily applied when firms find themselves in trouble. Thirdly, it should be targeted at firms that are in genuine need as a result of short-term working capital difficulties.
	Will the Minister give us an assurance about the eligibility criteria for the scheme? Will he assure us first, that it will be simple and transparent, and that firms will know when they are eligible; secondly, that it will be available quickly to firms when they find themselves in trouble; and lastly, that banks will not be able to use the scheme simply to replace their lending, rather than extending the money that is freed up to other firms?

Greg Hands: We heard mention of the German stimulus package. I have a copy of that document, "Entschlossen in der Krise, stark für den nächsten Aufschwung", which details a €100 billion loan guarantee scheme, including, crucially, for large businesses. The document states that such a large scheme is possible because a large balance budget was built in the good years, unlike the situation in this country. The Germans really did fix the roof while the sun was shining. Can the Minister explain why his package is so small, compared to that on offer in Germany and compared to that offered by the Opposition?

John Hutton: As my hon. Friend will know, I am not in a position to answer his question about the number of Iraqi civilian casualties. It has never been the job of the British military to quantify across Iraq the totality of civilian casualties. That is simply not a job we could do; first and foremost, it is the job of the Iraqi authorities. I am not going to stand here today and say that there has not been significant, appalling loss of life in Iraq since 2003. It has been an extremely difficult campaign, and the violence and terrorism that it has engendered has been significant—the point that I think that the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton was trying to make.
	The purpose of this debate is to talk about the future relationship between the United Kingdom, and our allies and partners, and Iraq. I perfectly understand the desire of hon. Members in all parts of the House to go over the decisions that led up to the invasion of Iraq. The hon. Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) referred to the role of other Government Departments in the campaign in Iraq. I am sure that when an inquiry is established, these are appropriate issues that can be looked at. I am not in a position today to say to the House when such an inquiry will be established—those are matters for my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. I want to deal with that issue in more detail in due course.

John Hutton: Indeed, I am aware of that. I am afraid that I do not accept responsibility for that; those were the actions of the previous Government, and, I have to say, not a very credible series of actions.
	Today, violence across Iraq is at its lowest level since 2003. While still capable of truly appalling atrocities, al-Qaeda in Iraq has suffered very severely at the hands of coalition forces. Increasingly—this is the positive side of it—Iraqi authorities are able to deliver security on the ground with only limited coalition support. Coalition forces have trained and equipped more than 560,000 Iraqi security forces personnel since 2004, meaning that there are about four Iraqi security personnel for every coalition soldier deployed in that country. In parallel, the coalition has worked very closely with the Iraqi Defence and Interior Ministries to develop their capacity both to support the front-line security forces and to exercise effective oversight of them—something that is very important in a functioning democracy.
	No one should be complacent, and we certainly are not, about the security situation across Iraq as a whole. Violence remains at an unacceptably high level in some parts of the country, and undoubtedly significant security challenges remain. However, I believe that there is now good reason to be optimistic about the future of Iraq. That is very much the mood—as I found for myself and other right hon. and hon. Gentlemen have too—in the city of Basra and in and around southern Iraq. The Defence Committee reported last July that the security situation in Basra was "a world away" from what it had been the year before. Very recently, the US ambassador in Iraq, Ryan Crocker, spoke of the situation in the south of Iraq as being "an extraordinary transformation".
	I saw that for myself during a visit to downtown Basra last year. The locals with whom I spoke were confident in the ability of the Iraqi security forces to preserve the peace that they now enjoy and were optimistic about the future. We should celebrate that. I believe that that sense of optimism is now widespread across Iraq. A few days ago, I spoke to the British commander in Basra, Major-General Andy Salmon, who is doing a fantastic job there—I hope that that is also the view of others in this place. He reported that morale among our military and civilian personnel in Basra is extremely high. It is high because they are confident that they will leave behind a positive and lasting legacy—not just of improved security but of increasing prosperity, about which I want to say more in a few moments.
	Basra is now reaping the dividends of coalition strategy in southern Iraq. Since 2003, UK forces have worked tirelessly to provide security, while simultaneously developing the capacity of the Iraqis themselves so that progress can be sustained over the long term. We have trained more than 20,000 Iraqi soldiers since 2004: first, as part of building up the 10th Iraqi army division in south-eastern Iraq; and, since 2007, training the 14th division in Basra itself.
	UK personnel have also helped the coalition to train Iraqi naval personnel and marines and more than 22,000 policemen. That long-term project to empower the Iraqis has proved instrumental in transforming the security situation. Only a year or two ago, as we all know, the situation was very different. Our presence in Basra—and I accept this—was acting as a magnet for militia violence and as a propaganda tool for extreme nationalists. We knew, as the Iraqi Government knew, that the British armed forces could not by themselves solve all Basra's security problems. It was essential that the Iraqis took the lead. We therefore developed, in consultation with the Iraqi Government and our coalition partners, a strategy under which we made a calculation about the right moment for UK forces to withdraw from the centre of Basra—very much on our own terms and to our own time scales—and adopted a role of tactical overwatch. The Iraqi authorities were given control of security. As General Petraeus, who personally approved the strategy, said at the time, that was
	"a positive step on the path to Iraqi self-reliance"
	and it began rapidly to change the security dynamics in Basra. It is one thing for a nationalist Shi'a militiaman to aim his rifle and to shoot at a British soldier whom he perceives as an occupier. It is quite another for him to shoot a soldier wearing the uniform of his own country.

John Hutton: I have given way to all of the hon. Gentlemen who are seeking to intervene. I hate to say it to the House, but I still have quite a long speech ahead of me. Given that all these issues can be fully aired and addressed in the debate, I would prefer to make a little progress with my speech.
	Our withdrawal set the conditions for the Iraqi soldiers that we had trained to secure public support as the first step towards winning back their city from the militias. In March last year, Iraqi security forces surged into Basra, as several hon. Members mentioned, to tackle militia violence and influence. By devising and implementing their own solution, the Iraqi security forces had proved themselves capable of solving an Iraqi problem. During these operations, and contrary to a lot of highly inaccurate reporting, the UK met the Iraqis' requests to provide close air support for ground operations. We provided aviation assets, artillery, logistics and medical expertise to support the operation of coalition and Iraqi forces. The US also played an important role, which I am happy and pleased to acknowledge, and allowed their personnel embedded with the Iraqi reinforcements that they were partnering in the north of the country to be redeployed to support their engagement in Basra. The end result of Operation Charge of the Knights represented a huge step forward: a secure and stable Basra. I hope that that is not in dispute. The success of that operation and the sustainment of the security gains it achieved is a vindication, not a contradiction, of the long-term strategy that we have pursued with our Iraqi partners.
	General Odierno, the current US commander in Iraq, said after a recent visit that our efforts there offered a model for successful transition across Iraq, and said that Basra is the way forward. That success will provide the foundation for our enduring bilateral defence relationship with Iraq in the years to come. Looking to the future, negotiations to ensure a firm legal basis for our military presence in Iraq in 2009 were concluded successfully at the end of 2008 and the new legal basis took effect from 1 January.

John Hutton: I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who was a Minister in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, for making that point. The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Bill Rammell) tells me that the Foreign Office is looking to improve access to visas and the arrangements that apply, especially to those travelling from specific parts of northern Iraq. Perhaps he can develop that point in his response to the debate.
	I pay special tribute to Michael Wareing and his work with the Basra Development Commission, which has successfully raised Basra's profile through a series of investment conferences—most recently last month in Istanbul—and drawn up an economic development strategy. That will become the work of, and come under the ownership of, the Iraqis later this year. It also addresses specific problems, such as youth unemployment, and recently announced a pilot scheme to provide 500 young Basrawis with employment training through placements with local businesses.
	The much-improved security situation means that international companies are now seriously considering investing in Iraq. That is a good thing. The UK has facilitated more than 15 investor visits to show international companies the opportunities available in Iraq. That has led to $9 billion worth of proposals being submitted to the Government of Iraq. The next step is for Iraqi institutions take forward that work. We have helped create the Basra Investment Commission, the launch of which the International Development Secretary attended in Basra on 6 November. Once fully operational, the BIC will lead on promoting investment opportunities in the city, turning proposals—I hope—into jobs and wealth. The opportunities are substantial.
	In addition to the development potential of Basra's international airport, Umm Qasr is Iraq's only deep water port. It is busier than ever, but antiquated equipment and methods mean that it does not yet achieve anything like its full potential. The UK and our coalition partners are working with the Iraqi authorities to develop the port, and it is one of the key areas in which international companies rightly look to invest.
	Iraq has the third largest reserves of oil in the world, and the potential to be an extremely wealthy country. However, decades of under-investment under Saddam and the effects of corruption and sabotage have left Iraq's energy infrastructure in a deplorable state. The Iraqi Government are now addressing that issue, looking to place major contracts with multinational companies to help repair and modernise equipment and to develop oilfields more efficiently, while ensuring that the Iraqi people retain ownership of their resources.
	There are huge investment opportunities for UK businesses, and the Government of Iraq, from Prime Minister al-Maliki downwards, have repeatedly emphasised their strong desire for increased UK investment in Iraq. I greatly hope that UK companies will be quick to join the rush of those seeking to take advantage of these opportunities.
	I have tried to describe the challenges that UK personnel have faced and overcome in southern Iraq. I cannot overstate the contribution of the UK's armed forces, but the achievements in southern Iraq have not been the result of UK military efforts alone—the mission has been joint in every sense. UK forces have co-operated with the Iraqi security forces and our coalition partners. In a prime example of the comprehensive approach that we have tried to follow, the UK effort has been developed and supported across Departments.
	Iraq's future is now in Iraqi hands, and the continued development of a stable, prosperous and democratic Iraq remains vital to the UK's strategic and national interests. Such an Iraq will promote stability and prosperity in the middle east and be a key ally in the fight against terrorism, and can make a major contribution to improved global energy security.
	Our mission in Iraq has freed Iraqis from the oppression of Saddam's brutal rule. It has empowered them to build their own democratic institutions and paved the way for a different and more positive future—for themselves and the region. I am proud to say that we are at the point of completing the UK mission. When we have done so, our forces can return home with their heads held high. However, their homecoming—warmly anticipated by their families and loved ones—will not be the end of our involvement in Iraq. We look forward to a long and fruitful bilateral relationship, covering the full range of co-operation and engagement, from security to economic, political to cultural: a relationship based on friendship and respect between Iraq and the UK, forged in exceptionally difficult times and now set to develop as a lasting legacy of the service and sacrifice of so many of the brave men and women of our armed forces, who have made all that possible.

Liam Fox: It is presumptuous if we think that we know what is good for the Iraqi people better than they do. It is clear to anyone who has been to Iraq and talked to the people there that those people believe that they are better off than they were under Saddam Hussein, because they have a chance to shape their own destiny in a way that they would have been perpetually denied under the authoritarian regime that existed previously. The Iraqi people know that they are better off, and I bend to their judgment on that matter. They are the ones who suffered under that regime.
	There is one further point to be made about the withdrawal of British troops and its impact. Let me say a word of caution. No one in this country should believe that removing our troops from Iraq will in some way be a panacea for troop shortages in southern Afghanistan. Many people, including some commentators, seem to believe that a simple shift of British troops from Basra to Helmand is possible. However, for some very good military, logistical and welfare reasons, it is not as simple as that. Although reduced commitments in Iraq may relieve the overstretch of our forces to some extent, the key to alleviating the shortfall in manpower in the vital, if not existential, struggle for NATO in Afghanistan is for our European allies to contribute more troops and equipment to the fight in southern Afghanistan. As we have said so often in the House, it is not acceptable for all the countries to get the insurance policy when only a few are paying the premiums.
	It is clear that our relationship with Iraq is changing and evolving, which is natural. That relationship can be viewed in a number of ways, as the Secretary of State said. It can be viewed as a commercial and economic relationship and as a military and political relationship. I want first to deal with the commercial and economic relationship, which the Secretary of State discussed. According to Iraqi Government officials, Iraq's budget surplus was $72 billion in 2008 and is forecast to be $90 billion in 2009, which is a change from what we are experiencing in the United Kingdom. Needless to say, a lot of money is being awarded in the form of lucrative contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq.
	Considering the Secretary of State's previous incarnation in the Cabinet, I am compelled to ask where Britain plays a role in that process. When I visited Iraq recently, I was horrified to learn that the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform had a representative in the UK embassy in Baghdad until 2007, but that the post was cut in 2008 owing to "resource issues". How short-sighted can we get? Our lack of trade presence in Baghdad means that we may have shed blood for Iraq but stand little chance of benefiting from the contracts flowing from Iraq's fiscal surplus.
	I found it rather pathetic that the FCO, the MOD and DFID were talking about pooling their budgets to get a trade representative in Baghdad, because the Government would not fund one centrally, which was certainly the position at the end of last year. I am sure that when the Minister responds to this debate, the House will want an assurance that that is no longer the case, because it is unacceptable to hon. Members on both sides of the House.
	There is a lot of potential for Iraq to become a regional financial and trading hub. We must do all that we can to help that become a reality, because, as the Secretary of State correctly said, a stable and prosperous Iraq is in all our interests. That is why we welcomed the Prime Minister's announcement about the formation of a Basra development commission in October 2007, with one of its goals being to
	"co-ordinate projects to strengthen Basra's position as an economic hub, including the development of Basra international airport and the renovation of the port."—[ Official Report, 8 October 2007; Vol. 464, c. 24.]
	The Prime Minister was referring to the port of Umm Qasr. I recently visited the airport, which is clearly ready for business. I also welcome the Secretary of State's announcement that the airport was transferred over to Iraqi control, on time, on 1 January.
	There are currently discussions about building a new deep-water port near Basra. Such a facility in the north of the Gulf could be the starting point for goods to be moved overland by rail from Iraq to Europe via Turkey, offering an alternative to the Suez canal and the strait of Hormuz and reducing the overall time to transport goods to Europe, which would be a major strategic advantage for us in the west. There is also talk of creating an economic free zone around Basra like that found in Dubai. Those would be extremely welcome projects not only for the people of Iraq, but for the region and, I believe, for us. We need to know what the Government think they can do to ensure that those projects become a reality.
	There is clearly a lot of reconstruction going on in Basra. When one visits it, it is not hard to imagine what a beautiful city it must have been and, almost by definition, could be again. There are plans to build a new bridge across the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which would drastically decongest the waterway and allow more shipping to get into the port. What are we doing to help all those projects? How is our expertise helping to make them a reality? I hope that the Minister will address those issues, because they will affect our future relationship with Iraq.
	Turning to our military relationship with Iraq, I welcome the fact that the Government believe that, some day, our military relationship will be
	"similar to the normal relationships that our military have with other important countries in the region".
	My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) has referred to that point as well, which is something that we should be aiming for. Right now, the main effort of the British Army is to train the Iraqi 14th Division so that it can eventually act autonomously while conducting security operations.
	But, as Britain's military role is transformed from being ground based to being maritime based, how will the status of forces agreement impact on our Royal Navy's ability to accomplish its mission of mentoring and training the Iraqi navy? I ask that because it is my understanding that the Australian Government have removed the Australian navy from Iraqi territorial waters—and, consequently, from coalition task force 158—over concerns about the status of forces agreement. There are differences between the UK-Iraq agreement and the agreement between Iraq and the United States. The UK's agreement gives Iraq far wider jurisdiction over UK service personnel, stating that they
	"shall be subject to the jurisdiction of Iraq with the exception of crimes committed by them while on duty which are not committed with intent or do not arise from gross negligence, and with the exception of those committed by them inside agreed facilities and military installations used by them, in which case they shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the country to which they belong."
	The qualifiers relating to intent and gross negligence do not appear in the US agreement. There is also no mention in the UK agreement of the due process protections offered to US service personnel. The House and our armed forces must be completely reassured that our forces are not in any way compromised when it comes to their legal protection. This is important because the Royal Navy is doing an outstanding job in securing Iraqi oil platforms and increasing the capability of the Iraqi navy as part of CTF158.

Liam Fox: As I think that I have made clear, it is a matter for the Iraqi Government, as they increasingly take control of their economic, military and political processes, to determine whether we should become involved at any particular place or time. They clearly feel that they have the internal security apparatus to deal with the undoubted problems that will exist as a result of the tensions inherent in their political system when the elections take place at the end of the month. All that we can hope is that they have made the correct judgment, and time will tell whether that is the case.
	There will also be a regional impact in respect of Iraq's own increasing military capability. The Iraqi army is now at 203,000 personnel and has a current growth ceiling of some 300,000. The Iraqi military is currently purchasing hundreds of American M1A1 main battle tanks and a number of C-130s, and there is the possibility of procuring American F-16 fighter jets. Obviously, those purchases make some of the neighbours nervous.
	It seemed early on that the procurement process in Iraq itself was quite chaotic—the Ministry of Defence is not alone—and that the hardware was being bought without due thought to training and support. I think that that is now being ironed out and that most observers feel that under American advice, some of those processes are being smoothed out. Perhaps it is just a lesson to those in Iraq that they do not want to run before they can walk, and that they should listen to the advice offered without regarding it as interference from outside. That advice is well meaning, because, having made so many sacrifices, the US and the UK want Iraq to succeed and do not want to interfere in how it does things.
	A strong Iraq is in all our interests, and a large and capable Iraqi army can contribute in many ways to a regional balance, especially towards Iran. Conversely, we must understand the impact that a large Iraqi military has on its neighbours such as Kuwait, which has shown mixed feelings towards the al-Maliki Government. If we simply look at a snapshot of Iraq's regional relations, we can see the difficult road that lies ahead for Baghdad. Although Prime Minister Al-Sabah recently visited Iraq, Kuwait is naturally cautious about Baghdad's motives, and there are still concerns over unpaid debts.
	Iraq and Iran have poor relations, although Iran was the first country in the region, if not the world, to set up an embassy in Baghdad after the 2003 invasion. The issue remains of Tehran attempting to maximise its influence with Shi'a members of the Iraqi Government and Shi'a-dominated regions, which our forces have seen with deadly consequences in the south, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood) has mentioned.
	Iraqi-Syrian relations are only a little better. Iraq accuses Syria of not doing enough to stop the flow of militants, while there is also concern about the large number of senior-ranking Ba'athists who fled Iraq in 2003 and who are currently resident in Syria. These tensions need to be defused over time, but perhaps the most urgent need is for an improved relationship between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Government have yet to send an ambassador to Baghdad. That is unfortunate, as it leaves the Iranian influence unbalanced. It would be to the benefit of all if the Saudis, as a regional leader, were to have a stronger diplomatic presence in Iraq.
	Iraq and Jordan enjoy good relations. King Abdullah was the first Arab Head of State to visit Iraq since the 2003 invasion, and Jordan receives cheap oil from Iraq. The main concern is the status of Iraqi refugees, but that issue is capable of resolution. Iraq's relationship with Turkey is a pivotal one. Turkey has been a very constructive and helpful partner in the development of the new Iraq, for which the international community should give it greater credit.
	There is, however, one problem about the forthcoming elections, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East has alluded. There will be a temptation for the Iraqi Government to play the "Arab-identity card" in those elections, which might attract Sunni voters and diminish the support that al-Qaeda still seems to have in parts of the north. However, it would be extremely unfortunate if Sunni-Shi'a tensions were to be replaced by Arab-Kurd tensions. Any destabilisation of the Kurds is likely to have a negative effect on Iraq's neighbours, particularly Turkey, which would be destabilising for the region and strategically bad for all of us.
	Finally, whatever mistakes were made in the early part of the war in Iraq, the decision to surge American forces was brave and effective. As we look to Afghanistan, we need to understand why the surge in Iraq worked. More forces enabled a change in the strategic approach, where forces moved off their forward operating bases to give security to the population where they lived. There was also an Iraqi surge with a huge increase in security forces to hold areas once they had been cleared of insurgency and militias. There were consequently no safe havens for insurgents, who were relentlessly pursued throughout Iraq. Support was given for the tribal uprising against al-Qaeda in Iraq and the political mission to separate the "reconcilables" from the "irreconcilables" under General Petraeus was absolutely key. The Iraqi Government showed that they had the will and the ability to deal with the Shi'ite militias—possibly the single most important event since 2003—and their more open and honest engagement with the media has greatly helped, too.
	All those things have helped to contribute to a more stable and secure Iraq. A stable, secure and prosperous unified state is in all our interests. Nothing, however, can be taken for granted. Progress has been made, but the situation remains fragile and therefore reversible, which requires all the help that we can give.

Kim Howells: The Iraqi Government will decide for themselves what they want to do with their oil industry, and quite properly so. If they need the expertise which, in my view, they do need in order to start tapping great oilfields such as the north and south Rumaylah fields, which are some of the most benign oil-bearing structures in the world, and if they are to repair the appalling damage done by the racketeers of Saddam Hussein and Jacques Chirac to those structures in order to rip easy money out of them, they will need the BPs of this world. They will need Esso. They will need companies that know how to do those things. The fact that the oilfields happen to be owned by a state Government does not mean that the necessary expertise is in place, and it is doctrinaire madness to say that the expertise of those companies should not be brought in. That is not the way in which to rebuild the oil and gas industries in Iraq; and they need to be rebuilt, because that is how we will get people back to work in cities such as Basra.
	It is clear to me that the people of Basra themselves understand that, after the sacrifice of many lives—the lives of British soldiers, American soldiers and, most, important, Iraqi soldiers—they now have within their grasp the opportunity to express themselves as entrepreneurs, as they have done in the past. Basra was always regarded as one of the places to which people wanted to go in the Gulf, and it will become that again. All the small businesses that are springing up in Basra will grow and sustain the economy of Basra and its great surrounding region. I am confident that Basra will again become the great entrepôt of the whole region, not just Iraq, and that the communication spine that runs through Iraq up to Irbil and the cities of the Kurdish-administered area will become the gateway to that part of the middle east. That, I believe, will bring prosperity and peace to the region—and God knows, it needs them.

Edward Davey: I am grateful for that intervention. I am sure that hon. Members are aware of that.
	We hope that Iraq will have the rosy future that the Secretary of State outlined, but we must be slightly less Panglossian about what is happening in Iraq today. To be fair, the Secretary of State admitted that many people are still dying. Hundreds died last year in bombings carried out not just by terrorists and al-Qaeda but by resistance forces in Iraq. The Americans refer to an irreducible minimum of casualties, and of awaiting a political accommodation, which we hope will happen. We hope that Iraq's security forces will perform ever more effectively, but the truth is that the security situation is still extremely fragile, and many polls suggest that in four of the main provinces many people believe that the security situation is worse than it was before 2003.
	The hon. Member for Pontypridd mentioned the economy and concern about the high level of unemployment. He is absolutely right; it is a huge drain on Iraq's society and economy. In many ways, this is a bad time for the Iraqi economy to have to get its act together, because of the world downturn. As the price of oil is now much lower, the previous boost no longer exists. We must consider how to support Iraq's economy.
	I take issue with the Secretary of State on the basic utilities in Iraq. Before the war, people in Baghdad enjoyed electricity for 16 or 24 hours a day but, according to the Brookings Institute, they now have it for only 14 hours a day. There is a huge amount of work to do just to get back to pre-war levels of electricity in Baghdad. I am happy to admit that the supply in the rest of the country is now better than before the invasion, but in Baghdad there are still huge problems.
	The same applies to other things. There is still a shortage of food in various parts of Iraq, 40 per cent. of the population does not have good access to clean water, and 30 per cent. does not have access to good health services. Before the war, there were more than 34,000 doctors, but 20,000 have left and 2,000 have been murdered. The health service in Iraq today is in an abysmal state. Let us be clear that although withdrawal is right, we will leave a country that is worse off in many ways than when we entered it, and that is before discussing refugees and so on.
	On the cost of the war, and therefore the need for an inquiry, I was disappointed that the Secretary of State was yet again unwilling to give the number of people who have been killed since 2003. He said that that is not the Government's responsibility, but there are many sources for such figures. As we try to learn the lessons, we must understand the sheer scale of the human cost. I also want to dwell on the cost to the British military, not just the lives lost but the wounded and those who will be left scarred for the rest of their lives, and the impact on their families. Charities such as Combat Stress, which are looking after almost 3,500 veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, report that ex-troops, who previously waited 13 years before asking for help, are doing so after just 11 months because of the stress and trauma that they have suffered. The suffering among our veterans is huge, and I hope that the Secretary of State will say more about what the Government are doing to redouble their efforts to help our troops.
	The hon. Member for Woodspring told us about the financial cost, which has been more than £6.5 billion, and is still £4 million a day. Will the Secretary of State comment on Professor Stiglitz's estimates? He examined the cost to US taxpayers and came up with a figure of $3 trillion. Estimates for the UK, not just of money paid out for the war and its aftermath, but of the social and economic cost of dealing with veterans and providing future support for Iraq, are up to £20 billion. Will the Secretary of State say whether that figure of £20 billion is valid, because my reading of Professor Stiglitz's report suggests that it was based on sound economic analysis? He is, after all, an economics professor of real standing.

Edward Davey: The hon. Gentleman will expect me to agree with him yet again.
	The cost of the war will rightly be audited in terms of lives lost, the impact on families and the actual money spent, but—I think the hon. Member for Woodspring got this wrong—it must also be audited in terms of this country's foreign policy objectives and our influence going forward. As my hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Sir Robert Smith) said in an intervention on the hon. Member for Woodspring, the cost in Afghanistan alone has been huge, and the military overstretch means that we have been unable to be as effective in Afghanistan as we could have been.
	There has also been an impact throughout the middle east, including Iran. Hon. Members on both sides of the House are rightly worried about Iran and how emboldened it has become, but I submit that without the Iraq war, Iran would be far weaker than it is today and be far less able to throw its weight around. It is rubbing its hands in glee about how power has shifted across the middle east. Tony Blair promised us that with the war would come a major effort to obtain a middle east peace settlement. He said that time and again from the Dispatch Box. Nearly six years on, what do we have? We have seen little progress. Mr. Blair's great friend, President Bush, turned his attention to a peace process in the middle east only in the final year of his presidency—so much for the promises that we were given in this House by Prime Minister Blair. That has been a massive failure in foreign policy.
	One hopes that the Annapolis process will not be completely damaged by the appalling situation in Gaza. When I went to Israel last November, I heard that there had been some progress with the peace talks. I am happy to acknowledge that. However, it has taken some time and the development is still very fragile.
	Let us look at the impact on terror and on terrorist movements across the world. In an exchange with the Secretary of State—again, he was unfortunately unable to answer me—I made the point that the Government were warned at the time that if they went into Iraq that would feed international terrorism. I think that it is a fairly objective judgment to say that world terrorism has been strengthened by the war in Iraq. I deeply regret that. It was a huge mistake that has fed jihadists around the world and is still a huge weapon to them in recruiting people to their cause.
	The most ironic factor is the cost to our relationship with the United States. If there was one secret justification for what happened, it was Tony Blair's desire to stand shoulder to shoulder with President Bush. He wanted this country to be friendly and powerful, cementing the special relationship. Now we have a President-elect who was against the war and who described it as a "dumb war". That is one of the major lessons that we should learn: Presidents of America change and politics change. Yes, the Americans are our friends. They should be our greatest friends. We share so much with them and we share their values, but the true friend speaks candidly, is frank and tells the truth. Our failure to be honest and truthful with President Bush has not strengthened our relationship, but undermined it. What I fear most is that President Obama will look at this country and say, "I'm afraid you made the wrong judgment. You could have helped to stop this war or have prevented it in the first place, but you failed to do that." That means that we are not in strong position with the new President, and I deeply regret that.
	There are many other costs that I could talk about, such as the impact on security in this country with respect to Muslim communities and the damage done to British politics by the way the Labour and Conservative parties seem to ignore public opinion. However, I want to conclude by making the case for an inquiry. The Government have said that there will be an inquiry, but their refusals to say when it will happen or what the criteria will be for setting it up do them no credit whatsoever. It is time that the Government came clean about when an inquiry will be held. The Secretary of State's failure to say even what level of troops we need to have left in Iraq before an inquiry will be triggered is quite shocking. I hope that he will go back to the Prime Minister and say, "Parliament wants to know when an inquiry will be set up." Until we get an answer, we will continue to harry him and his colleagues in this House.

Ann Clwyd: The Prime Minister has also answered that question. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman has not been in the House very often, but the Prime Minister has answered that question several times. As soon as our troops are totally withdrawn, there will be an inquiry. I do not think that there is an issue, so I do not know why the hon. Gentleman is making one.
	My involvement with, and interest in, the human rights of the Iraqi people goes back three decades. I led the non-governmental organisation the Campaign Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq—CARDRI—in the 1980s and I chaired the non-governmental organisation INDICT for seven years until 2003 as it gathered evidence of the crimes committed by Saddam Hussein's appalling regime. We hoped to be able to get indictments against leading members of that regime and to bring them in front of the world's courts. We made every effort to do that at the time and thus to avoid armed conflict. That did not happen and we were thwarted in various ways that I do not want to go into today.
	As other Members have pointed out this afternoon, we must not forget how vile Saddam Hussein's regime was, or the brutal way in which it used violence, rape, torture and the threat of violence as everyday tools of the state to keep the population in check and to deal with those who disagreed with him. I had an Iraqi friend who volunteered for CARDRI when he was a student in London in the 1980s. Every fortnight, he used to bring me a list of the names of those who had been executed at the Abu Ghraib prison. At times, I challenged him about the accuracy of those reports, but I am sorry to say that they were indeed accurate. Since the war, we have been able to establish that everything that was alleged to have taken place during that awful period actually happened.
	In 2002-03, when the prospect of intervention in Iraq arose, it appeared that all other options had been exhausted. They included UN resolutions and sanctions, although, as my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd said, the sanctions regime might have worked if people had been serious about it and if it had not been directed at the regime and away from the people it was meant to help. We even attempted indictments against leading members of the regime. I went to several countries, including Switzerland, Norway and Belgium, to get those indictments and I tried in the UK. For people who argue for the strengthening of international law, that attempt was a case in point; those indictments could have been made—they could have been made in this place—but they were not made at the time because people were afraid to use international law to bring members of that regime to justice.
	I was never in any doubt—and never will be—about the morality of ridding Iraq and the world of Saddam's regime. Since 2003, I agree that Iraq has gone through some terrible times. Insurgent groups have used violence and terrorism to try to stop democratic progress and to drag Iraq into the abyss of sectarian hatred and bloodshed. I have always believed, however, that the wisdom and ingenuity of the Iraqi people would win out and that Iraq could and would become a functioning democracy. Iraq has come a long way since 2003 and it has made real progress.
	I should like to give pen portraits of all the people I know who are contributing to the future of Iraq, in which I hope we all feel engaged. One of them is the man I mentioned—a young Iraqi student in the mid-1980s. He made quite a lot of money in the UK, but as soon as 2003 came he sold his manufacturing businesses and went back to Iraq. He is still there. He invested all his money in setting up a broadcasting station, which is now one of the most successful operating in Iraq. There are many such heroic stories of young Iraqis, forced to go to other countries during the Saddam regime, who have chosen to return to their country and contribute to its future.
	Last week, I was in Cambodia visiting various organisations, one of which was the Cambodia Trust. It was set up in the UK by Dr. Peter Carey and others to help provide services for the limbless in Cambodia—the result of land mines, which I am sorry to say we helped to plant, and other activities. However, the Cambodia Trust and other organisations are helping some of those people. I met three young Iraqi men who had come from Iraq to learn how to do that work. I spoke to each of them individually; they all said they were glad that the Saddam Hussein regime was no more. They were pleased that some countries had intervened on their behalf. People tend to forget that.
	I have been going to the Kurdish area of Iraq since the early 1990s. I was on the mountains between Iran and Iraq when Saddam Hussein's helicopter gunships were bombing the Kurds. It was a horrific sight. Those of us who saw pictures at the time will remember seeing Kurds fleeing across the mountains in terrible weather conditions. I shall never forget meeting some of them—I was the only woman there and people holding babies in their arms pushed the babies at me. Of course, the babies were already dead. We never forget things like that.
	I was with the Kurds regularly during the '90s when they were camped out in the mountains and Saddam Hussein was attacking them. At various times before 2003, they tried to overthrow the regime but each time they were brutally repressed. The same is true of the Shi'a; when they tried to overthrow the regime, there were terrible consequences. There is, for example, a mass grave in the south of the country in which 15,000 people, who are likely to have been Shi'a, are said to be buried. The excavations are still going on. Those people tried to overthrow the regime, but they failed. That is when they asked us to help.
	There are issues of concern, obviously. I remain concerned, as I am sure many others do, about the humanitarian situation in Iraq and the region. I think that a co-ordinated international effort, with the Government of Iraq in the lead, is the best response. In 2008, we contributed £17 million to help displaced Iraqis. Our total humanitarian contribution since 2003 has been more than £149 million.
	As we know, there is a large number of internally displaced people, and many refugees in Syria and Jordan. Some of them have returned, but not all. I have been to visit refugees in Syria. I must pay tribute again to the Syrian Government for their support for those refugees. It is easy for everybody to welcome refugees in the first instance, but it is difficult to continue that support when it puts strain on a country's housing, employment and education systems. Having seen what happened there and having talked to the UN, I think it is important that the Government of Iraq continue to recognise that they have a responsibility to those refugees who unfortunately had to flee to other countries and to the internally displaced people in Iraq, some of whom are in a very difficult situation.
	Organisations such as the UN are providing assistance to the most vulnerable people, whether displaced inside or outside Iraq. Those organisations give support in the provision of food, water, shelter and medicine. The hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey) mentioned the lack of electricity, water and so on. One of the problems for the people trying to repair that situation is that the infrastructure had been neglected for years. It was crumbling, even before the war. Obviously, the people trying to put that right are proceeding as fast as they can, but because of the security situation, they have not been able to do it as quickly as they would like. More than 4 million people have been displaced; probably 2.8 million of them are inside Iraq and about 2 million are in neighbouring countries.
	The number of Iraqi Government Ministers who are doing a tremendous job is clear to all of us who visit Iraq regularly. The decision to create a Human Rights Minister was important, as the role has endured. I know the present and the previous Minister well. Both are conscientious and dedicated to human rights. I met the current Human Rights Minister, Wijdan Mikhail Salim, in October in Geneva. She used to be a planner in Sadr City before the war. She is a very brave woman, and she spoke frankly about the limitations on the work of the Ministry of Human Rights, but also its successes.
	For example, the Ministry responded very quickly to the threats made against minorities, including Christians, in Mosul last autumn. Of course, not only Christians are affected; I wish that people who are lobbying on behalf of persecuted people would also mention the other minorities, of which there are a number. The Human Rights Minister sent blankets and food aid, as well as an inspection team. The newly trained Iraqi army, sent by Prime Minister al-Maliki, also responded quickly to what was going on in Mosul.

Ann Clwyd: I absolutely agree. The hon. Lady agreed to take part in one of the video conferences that we had to cancel, and I hope that she will participate in a future one. It is important for those women to feel solidarity with women in this Parliament. They value the British particularly—I cannot emphasise enough how much the Iraqi people value British involvement. Our continued involvement is certainly important in rebuilding the country.
	We should remember that for the first time in many generations, Iraqis enjoy basic rights—for example, freedom of speech, expression and association and the right to take part in democratic processes. I remember meeting the leader of Baghdad city council in 2003. I asked him how things had changed. He looked at me and said, "Madam, if I had met you two years ago, I would have been able to say to you only, 'Hello', 'Long live Saddam Hussein' and, 'Goodbye'. Now I can say anything I want to you."
	About two years ago, I went to the marshes with an Iraqi Water Minister—it was the first visit to the devastated marshes by a new Iraqi Government Minister. The water ministry is responsible for re-flooding the marshes, which were drained by the previous regime. Life is beginning to return to the marshes, although there are not as many people as lived there previously—many of the people fled or were killed when Saddam Hussein attacked the Marsh Arabs. However, we met a representative group, and as we went round the villages, people ran out, hugged us and laughed and clapped. We sat down with the community leaders in a big building made of rushes, as all buildings on the marshes are. They started banging the floor and saying to the Minister, "We want better roads, education and better housing." I sat there and thought that two years previously they could not have done that—if they had done so, they would not have been there that day.
	Freedom of expression is important, as we have seen in the Iraqi press, which we have played an important role in retraining. The Institute for War and Peace Reporting, based in this country, has done good work on retraining Iraqi journalists. Previously, they had to write reports from reports that had been given them and could not change anything. When we see them rethinking and challenging ideas that people have given them, it is impressive. I hope that we continue to support the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, which does excellent work in Afghanistan and many countries that I have visited where freedom of the press has not been part of the culture.
	There are human rights issues and challenges facing Iraq today. When the Prime Minister addressed the House just before Christmas, he said that
	"the relationship between Iraq and Britain will be strengthened at a cultural, economic...and social level".—[ Official Report, 18 December 2008; Vol. 485, c. 1241.]
	He talked about our commitment to the economic development of Iraq and scholarships in the UK for Iraqi students, which is all very welcome.
	A few weeks before Christmas, I went to the British Library, which had organised an event for the chief librarian of Iraq's main library in Baghdad, Dr. Saad Eskander. Since the war, he has had a good relationship with the British Library. He gave us a slide show and a talk about how he had found Iraq's library when he went there in 2003. The library was no more. All the documents and books had been burned, and there were just ashes on the floor. Then he showed us what he has done since, with the help of the British Library. He has been able to rebuild some of the collection through copies of books and documents that existed there. We listened to him talk about his enthusiasm for rebuilding the library in Iraq and how many young people he has brought in to work there, particularly a large number of women. He said that he would very much value continued British help. At the end of his speech, the audience of a couple of a hundred people—librarians and chief executives from all over the country—got to their feet and applauded him, because his story was such a poignant example of how to rebuild from the ashes. There are many other examples in Iraq of people who do similar things.
	A couple of months ago, I chaired a human rights forum on Iraq at the Foreign Office. Fifty people were there, and three Iraqi Ministers were among the participants. There were people from non-governmental organisations and trade union groups, officials and academics. The universal view at that meeting was that British involvement in building Iraqi civil society would be essential in future. We agreed that the group would meet regularly, every three months, and that working groups would focus on freedoms, the rule of law and the role of women. We will also involve NGOs from Iraq, which I had hoped would be able to take part in that first meeting, but the line broke down or there was a problem in Iraq, so they could not get the sound link. There are many NGOs working in Iraq, and it is very impressive to see them do so. The British Government have assisted NGOs in getting off the ground. There are people working with the disabled and with widows, and people working on corruption, which is a brave thing to do in any country, but particularly so in Iraq at this time. People are working on all aspects of life in civil society. When one spends a day or two with them, one feels that there is considerable optimism and determination among the Iraqi people.
	Everybody agrees that women are a key part of rebuilding the country and establishing it more firmly as a representative democracy. We must continue to lobby the Iraqi Government, so that when the national elections take place at the end of the year, the 25 per cent. quota for women is still in place. The women MPs whom I know, who have built a strong caucus within the Council of Representatives, must be allowed to continue to speak out and shape the future of their country. The Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament has recently been forced to stand down. One of the things that he did prior to being asked to step down was verbally to attack women in Parliament for not having suffered enough. At that point, all the women stuck together and walked out of the Parliament. It is heartening to see such groupings forming.
	The freedom of the press is crucial in Iraq. I receive a synopsis of the Iraqi press every day, and it is amazing to see the spread of opinion across the publications, daily and weekly, that exist in that country. I have been contacted on a number of occasions by concerned Iraqis, the National Union of Journalists and others about violence and threats made against journalists in all parts of Iraq. I have lobbied the Iraqi Government in Baghdad and the Kurdish regional government to treat all those cases with great seriousness. We must keep the pressure on to ensure that Iraqi journalists can work without fear. One of the obvious developments in a democracy is that the press are more or less free to write what they like, which is essential in Iraq. That is one way of ensuring that corruption does not take place.
	I return to the example of my friend who runs the radio station. Some time last year, he was approached by an official from a department who was planning to advertise on his station. He was told, "We'll pay you so-and-so, but you'll have to give me back so-and-so." My friend was very brave; he said, "Can you please sit there? I have to go and do something for a moment," and he went upstairs to his studio and broadcast over the air what had happened in the room below. When he went back to the room, the man who had made the offer had disappeared, and an official appeared about a week later to apologise profusely that anyone should have done something like that. To have such brave people speaking out is the best way of combating corruption.
	I have taken an interest in the rule of law in Iraq for a long time, and Indict has supplied 35 box-loads of evidence to the trials that continue in that country. The rule of law has developed a great deal since Saddam's time, when the law was used as a brutal tool of repression. I hope that we will continue to press the Iraqis on the implementation of their amnesty law. It is a well-written law that should allow for the release of those who have been held without trial. We should also offer advice and training to the Iraqi authorities charged with running prisons. Right now the Iraqi Ministers of Justice, the Interior, Defence and Labour and Social Affairs run prisons. Many of those prisons are overcrowded, and the situation for the inmates is intolerable. I hope that we will continue to provide any support that the Iraqis ask for to improve conditions in their prisons. We have supplied specialists at various times to give advice on how to run prisons, including prison officers from this country. That support must accompany training for judges to allow those who are arrested to be brought to trial quickly and fairly.
	I know that as our military support to Iraq draws down, our work to support the growth of civil society and a culture of human rights will continue. I am hopeful that in 10 years' time, Iraq will be a country where all of us, if we want to, can go on holiday in safety and that we will see a much-strengthened Iraqi democracy to which we have done much to contribute.

James Arbuthnot: I never thought in 1984, when I stood for Parliament against the right hon. Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd), that it would give me such pleasure to follow a speech of hers on a subject such as this. I found it extremely moving. The optimism that we are now expressing in relation to Iraq may well mean that her role as special envoy on human rights is no longer needed, and there could be no greater tribute to her than that.
	While I am on a Welsh theme, I shall say how much I enjoyed the speech of the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Dr. Howells). As the right hon. Lady said, he has clearly been released from his chains. He relaxed into his speech in a way that I think the entire House found enormously enjoyable.
	Whatever the controversy over the origins of the war in Iraq, over such things as dodgy dossiers and 45 minutes—frankly, I found neither of those nearly as important as the media have since made them out to be—and over the planning of the aftermath of the war, which was much more important, the fact remains that our armed forces went in with our allies the United States, the Danes, the Australians and many others. They went into Iraq and made great sacrifices. They were doing it for us, for this country, but also for the good of the region, Iraq and the world. The result, as we now see, has given rise to the hope that we have discussed throughout the debate.
	The Defence Committee has visited Iraq regularly. Our analysis of what happened between 2003 and 2007 was that things were getting steadily worse. When we visited in 2007, for example, we found that there were rockets and bombs where we were every couple of hours or so. We were meant to have dinner with the President of Iraq, but the place where we were to have it was destroyed half an hour before we got there. Luckily the dinner was not, and it was sent round to the British embassy with the usual Iraqi hospitality that we have come to expect.
	We found also that when we were in convoys in 2007, there was such a threat from the local population that everybody was forced off the road as our convoy went past, and guns were trained on them because of the risk of suicide bombings. We found that we were not allowed into the centre of Basra because we were considered too high-value a target.
	By contrast, last year we were there for five days and there was not a single rocket or mortar attack. Things were so busy that only the vice-Chairman of the Committee and myself were able to go into Basra, but we did so in a convoy that, far from forcing everybody off the road, got stuck in a traffic jam. Nobody seemed the least bit bothered about it. Not only were there no rocket or mortar attacks, but we heard afterwards that British troops who went into the centre of Basra in military uniform were not allowed to pay for anything because of the popularity of the British, to which the right hon. Lady referred. I hope that we can recognise the value of what the British have done in Basra and elsewhere in Iraq to the same extent that the people of Basra do. We should not constantly denigrate what we as a country have done.
	Operation Charge of the Knights transformed the situation in Basra. My understanding of what happened is that there was a general misunderstanding—at the British level and the Baghdad, Iraqi Government level—about the level of militia control of Basra. Prime Minister al-Maliki decided to send in the 14th division. The decision nearly foundered and failed, and reserves had to be sent in. Prime Minister al-Maliki's decision was a surprise to the United Kingdom and the United States. The time scale was brought forward in a way that was perceived as unwise because of the risk of failure, which British and US military advisers identified.
	Nevertheless, Prime Minister al-Maliki's decision was brave. He was determined to take back his country from the grip of the militias. He recognised the importance of taking back Basra—the country's economic heart. When the exercise nearly failed because of the militias' grip, other Iraqi reserve forces came in, with United States mentors. A major battle for Basra took place and it was successful.
	We should pay great tribute to the Iraqi troops for their achievements, the British troops for the training that they gave the Iraqi troops and the American mentors, who managed to establish in the eyes of General Mohan that American troops could be welcomed on the streets of Basra. That also transformed the standing of British troops in Basra.
	As I understand it, the Basra police were involved in the battle for Basra as follows: a third fought on the side of the Iraqi army; a third stayed at home, and a third fought on the side of the militias. The Iraqi army took on those who fought for the militias and defeated them. That was a crucial defeat. We contributed a great deal with a small police mission from the United Kingdom, which did good work, to training the police. However, it is essential, if we are considering our future strategic relationship with Iraq, to ensure, through training, that the Basra police do not revert to the corruption and militia control that previously existed. It is therefore essential that the size of the UK police mission and its formulation is good enough and strong enough to ensure that the police in Basra remain in the supportive state that they have now reached.
	When we last visited Basra in June, we found that people spoke about the economy much more than security. That was a great step forward. Despite the traffic jams, which are a good economic sign, we noticed that there was high unemployment in Basra. Despite the security achievements, high unemployment had become the greatest risk.
	Iraq is potentially one of the richest countries in the world. The oil infrastructure is in serious need of renewal and expansion to exploit those riches. That is not a criticism of Iraq, except in that it is a criticism of Saddam Hussein, but the situation represents a major opportunity for British companies. As the hon. Member for Pontypridd said, we need the Shells and the BPs to go in there and exploit those resources and renew that infrastructure. We have a combination of experience that could be absolutely optimal for getting that oil exploited by and for the Iraqis. We have oil expertise and a level of good will among the Basrawi population that is second to none. That good will needs to be built on.
	I was therefore particularly worried by the strong point that the shadow Secretary of State for Defence made about the low importance that appears to be given to the development of British-Iraqi business links by the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. We must address that, because it is essential that Government agencies pull out all the stops to help the links between Britain and Iraq to grow, particularly in the oil sector, if it is true that the Ministry of Defence and DFID are thinking of pooling resources to get a representative. One representative is not enough. We need far stronger representation in Iraq in order to help the Iraqis build their economy and to help British companies, too, to benefit from that.
	I want to turn, penultimately, to naval training, because, still on the issue of oil, the two oil platforms, one of which we visited in June last year, produce 90 per cent. of Iraqi income. They are terribly vulnerable and are protected by an Iraqi navy that is mentored and trained by the Royal Navy. The importance, therefore, of the work of the Royal Navy is obvious. The Royal Navy is involved in a huge task that is essential to the economic viability of the whole of Iraq. However, I am not entirely sure that the Secretary of State's comments gave quite enough prominence to that importance.
	I hope that the naval training that the Royal Navy carries out in Iraq will recognise that Iraq intends either to double or to treble the size of its navy in one year. That is rather a tall order. The Iraqi navy will still be a navy of small size, but it is important that we have a mission that is large enough, strong enough and of a high enough quality to be able to ensure that that transition works and works well.
	I would be grateful if either the Minister in his reply or somebody in a letter could tell me whether the order for ships that was originally made from Malaysia by the Iraqis remains on foot or whether it has been cancelled. If it has been cancelled, as I fear it may have been, it would be good to know, from a naval point of view, what size the Iraqi navy will be, in view of the importance of the task that it will be undertaking.
	In conclusion, I would like to read a couple of sentences from a briefing that the Iraqis themselves gave us for this debate. The fact that they are looking beyond the shores of their country to what is happening in other Parliaments is also a welcome development. What the Iraqis say is this:
	"We believe in an Iraq that can be a beacon for democracy, freedom and moderation in the Middle East. It is the undemocratic nature of regimes in this region that has bred poverty, backwardness and extremism in a region which should be one of the most prosperous regions in the world. A democratic Iraq, that is stable and unified, will turn the tide against those who rule through tyranny."
	Even as an aspiration, that is a fantastic thing to say, and it is a tribute to the Iraqis. It is also a tribute to those British men and women who have sacrificed so much and achieved so much in order to allow the Iraqis to have that aspiration.

Bernard Jenkin: I do not know what discussions took place between the British and American Governments about that. I have no doubt that the promise was made, and I have no doubt that it was broken with the understanding of the Americans because it coincided with the commencement of our operations in Helmand province. My hon. Friend is right to point out another example of how we always promised more than we could deliver. At the heart of those failures was the fact that Ministers, and perhaps civil servants, never truly understood the nature of military tasking and the consequent burden that the armed forces would have to bear to follow through our commitments.
	From Operation Telic 2 onwards, the number of British troops in multinational zone south was never sufficient for the task in hand. By May 2004, a year after the invasion, there were just 8,600 British troops in Iraq, compared with 18,000 a year before and 46,000 at the time of the invasion in March 2003. Even at those reduced levels in 2004-05, before the deployment to Helmand, our armed forces were still operating beyond the defence planning assumption set out in the 1998 strategic defence review. At the heart of the problem was the fact that the Government insisted that the budget for the armed forces was sufficient, although it was planned as a peacetime budget and we were fighting a considerable war.
	Our armed forces, as the Government had configured them in the 1998 strategic defence review, were not large enough for the task that the Government required of them in Iraq, and the situation deteriorated when we deployed in Helmand in 2006. As the need for more troops in the politically "good" war in Afghanistan grew ever more urgent, the so-called "bad" war in Iraq became ever more embarrassing for the Government, and the number of troops in Operation Telic dwindled further to 7,200 in May 2006 and to just 5,500 in May 2007, shortly before the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, left office. That was one year before Operation Charge of the Knights.
	It might have been assumed that the steady reduction in the number of the British forces occurred because the situation in Iraq was improving, but everyone in the House knows that 2006 and 2007 were the bloodiest years of the war. In the 21 months from the beginning of 2006 to the withdrawal from Basra palace in September 2007, British forces suffered 64 combat deaths, just under half of the 136 combat deaths sustained during the six years since operations began in 2003. Faced with an intensifying insurgency campaign in southern Iraq, the Government simply failed to provide the men and equipment necessary to have a chance of defeating the militants. Indeed, in late 2007, the Prime Minister came to the House and announced that there would be a further troop reduction in the following spring to below the 5,000 level that the Select Committee on Defence had been briefed was the bare minimum.
	Let us take a step back for a moment. Originally, Mr. Blair, when Prime Minister, was determined to hang on in Iraq to preserve our strategic relationship with the Americans, but I shall argue that our failure to provide the necessary military capacity has ended in materially damaging the very relationship that he most wanted to maintain.
	Most shameful was the Government's attitude towards our troops still serving in Basra. Lacking the courage to try to explain their mission to the British public, Ministers continued to send our troops to Iraq in the knowledge that their mission lacked the support of the British people. Nothing can be more dispiriting to a soldier than knowing that the sacrifices that he and his comrades are making are not appreciated by those in whose name they are being made.
	The mood of those deployed in Basra in 2007 was summed up by one Army captain, who told  The Times:
	"We didn't ask to come here...We are making incredible efforts and sacrifices. Yet sometimes it feels like our country and Government act like they wish we weren't here at all."
	I am glad that the Government appear to have learned the lessons from Basra and have made considerable efforts since to demonstrate public support for the armed forces, but the words of that captain should make every Minister hang his or her head in shame. Indeed, that is a lesson that we should take on across the whole House.
	The Government ran out of the political will and military capacity to do the job, which lead to our tactical failure in southern Iraq. As the Americans surged into Iraq in the first half of 2007, the British Government were looking to get out. It is extraordinary to see the difference between what we were briefed in Basra and what we were briefed in Baghdad about the likely efficacy of the surge. Those events led to our strategic failure with both the Iraqi and American Governments. What General Petraeus's chief counter-insurgency adviser described as the British
	"defeat in the field in southern Iraq"
	during 2006 led to our being sidelined by the Iraqi Government and the American military in Baghdad.
	The British contribution to the Iraqi army's Operation Charge of the Knights in March and April 2008, which succeeded in driving the Mahdi army out of Basra, was severely limited by what we had available and by the political timidity of our own Government. Prime Minister al-Maliki told  The Times later that year that the "British military doctrine" may have been one of the reasons that prevented the spread of security. It is worth reflecting on the fact that had the British Army had the capacity and political backing to do the job that was necessary in Basra, Operation Charge of the Knights should never have been necessary. It was only necessary because we basically had to walk away and hand the city over to the Jaish al-Mahdi—JAM—militias.
	Although we can recover from that tactical setback relatively quickly, worse by far has been the effect on our relations with the Americans. I was a little surprised to hear the Secretary of State tell the House on Monday that relationships and confidence between the British and American militaries were as good as he claimed. I choose to put a favourable face on that, which is that both sides are doing as much as they can to repair the damage and to restore confidence. I commend him for that. I am sure that he was not misleading the House, but our American partners would welcome some candid and open frankness about some of the shortcomings of our military effort and the political backing for that effort rather than a pretence that everything in the garden is lovely.
	Although the Americans under General Petraeus have revolutionised their approach to counter-insurgency warfare, our armed forces were never given the capacity to undertake truly effective COIN operations, and we were therefore unable to defeat the Mahdi army. The view in Washington is that we failed in southern Iraq and that is having serious repercussions on how the Americans view our contribution in Afghanistan and on our future role as their primary ally of choice.
	A report currently circulating in the Ministry of Defence reveals the serious doubts in Washington about the British performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to one British source, the report showed:
	"Britain's military ability is no longer rated as highly as we thought it was."
	The painful lessons of Iraq for the British have yet to be applied fully in Afghanistan. We are more effective at counter-insurgency than we were, but we still suffer a command chain divided between the MOD and DFID—a divide that stretches right to the heart of Government, and the further up the command chain, the more serious it is. The result is a complete lack of strategic co-ordination between the civil and military efforts. If we ask the question, "Who is the Secretary of State for Afghanistan?", the answer is that there is a Cabinet Committee that meets once a fortnight. We cannot conduct a war on the basis of a Cabinet Committee that meets once a fortnight.
	One of the things we should have understood from the tragedy of our experience in Iraq is that although we have excellent tactical effectiveness on the ground in Helmand and a brilliant campaign plan, we do not have a plan to win the war at grand strategic level. Until the Government grasp that point, we will simply be passengers in whatever the Americans decide to do. Furthermore, there is a danger that if the British Government do not significantly increase their military and civilian reconstruction commitment in Helmand in a co-ordinated fashion in early 2009, the Americans will feel compelled to take over command of Regional Command (South) and will regard subsequent improvements in the security situation as attributable to their efforts, in contrast to the perceived British failures between 2006 and 2008. So stretched is the British Army at present that even with the draw-down from Iraq, it is likely that no significant increase of British forces in Helmand will be possible, so such a scenario may be one that we have to accept.
	The erosion of American confidence in the British military is the greatest strategic failure of UK foreign and defence policy for decades. Enthusiasm for EU and UN initiatives is no substitute. Faith in international institutions is too often misplaced, as they all too often prove wholly ineffective. The Government continue to profess that the transatlantic alliance remains the cornerstone of British security policy, but with the election of possibly the least Atlanticist US presidency since before the second world war, and plenty of rivals for US attention elsewhere in the world, our relationship with the UK is now at its most vulnerable since the Vietnam war.
	That is the legacy of the Government's failure in post-invasion Iraq. We damaged our standing in the wider world by going in, even if it was the right thing to do, and damaged our relationship with the US by never having sufficient political will or military capacity to keep the promises we made to the Iraqi people and to our allies. The result is that we have taken much of the pain for none of the gain. Such is the opprobrium in which we are held by the Iraqi Government that French or German companies are winning far more contracts in Iraq than British companies. The Minister grimaces at that—I will give way to him if he would like to dispute it—but the fact is that French and German companies, alongside the Americans, are winning the lion's share of the contracts.
	The Government are holding this debate because they think they finally have some good news from Iraq and they want to crow about it. It is good news that Iraq is improving and that our troops will be able to come home. At least they can hold their heads up high for their achievements, but they come back knowing—as we all know—that they have been let down at almost every step of their journey to and from Iraq.

Adam Holloway: We are in danger of becoming dewy-eyed over the debacle in Iraq. In this century, we have never had a serious strategy for dealing with Iraq. That was the case as we went into the war and after the war, and I fear that it is also the case today.
	The decision to offer UK support to the US invasion was made by the Prime Minister, pretty much alone, in Crawford, Texas in April 2002. The only thing that seemed to be on Tony Blair's mind at the time was winning influence with the United States, a strategy whose success is now rather in doubt, as we have just heard from my hon. Friend the Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin).
	There is no evidence that before the then Prime Minister went to Crawford, he sought or received any advice from the Ministry of Defence. He is reported to have gone to the chiefs on his return from the UK and said, "Let's make a plan to support a US invasion." On the day of the invasion, we still had no agreement with the US on the political end state. Indeed, for the UK, the end state, according to a note from Downing street of 22 October 2002, was for Iraq to become a
	"stable, united and law abiding state".
	For the Americans, the end state seems to have been destroying Saddam's leadership and his supporting power base. Those are two completely different things.
	The fact is that we ended up in Basra only because of a decision made in the Turkish Parliament. Originally, we were to go in via Turkey, and our troops were to have been in Mosul and the Kurdish areas, which would have been a completely different proposition. We involved ourselves in an American-led invasion through a decision taken by our Prime Minister at a ranch in Texas, without reference to the people who would carry it out. We ended up taking responsibility for southern Iraq almost by accident.
	Once we were in, we tried desperately to find the justification for being there—that is, weapons of mass destruction. We could not do so, and we have spent all our time since trying to get out of the country. We reduced our forces as soon as possible from 46,000-odd men and women to about 15,000. At the same time, we were telling anyone who wanted to hear how great we were at counter-insurgency. Our focus was not on development or the restoration of security for Basra—security which, by the way, we were obliged to restore under the Geneva convention—but on the reduction of forces.
	We were also pretty complacent. I remember a friend of mine returning from a trip to Basra. He said that he had wandered around among the civilian population and realised what a big problem unemployment and the lack of fast resumption of some services would be. He said that he was amazed at the complacency that he found within the Ministry of Defence on the issue.
	After the start of the Shi'a insurgency and increasing militia control of Basra and Amarah, we built a new police force. I suppose that it could be argued that it made sense to go to the existing groups of armed men, but unfortunately they were the militias, so almost from the off, we took away the pre-existing structures and put in post people whose first loyalty was not to Iraq, but to their own factions. The police were really just militias in uniform. The best example of that was Basra's so-called Serious Crimes Unit, which was packed with people from the Jaish al-Mahdi—the JAM militia—who conducted their terrorist operations in police uniforms with police vehicles and weapons. They kidnapped the British CBS journalist Richard Butler last year, and they took two of our special forces people, who had to be rescued from a police station in Christmas 2006. As a senior Iraqi general was later to say, the police were, at the time, the cause of our security problem.
	At that point, the increasingly terrorised civilian population lost confidence in the British, but we were busy being complacent about Iran. We made no serious attempt to control the border, possibly because we did not have sufficient troops. There was easy movement of men and equipment across the border, which fed the Shi'a insurgency right across the country. Nearly all that stuff came through the UK area.
	From the start, we spent a lot of money on development, but as in the case of Afghanistan, we decided that it was important that the Iraqis were seen to be delivering services to the people, so we pumped the money through the provincial council in Basra. Guess what? A lot of people got rich, but services did not improve dramatically. Even today, Basrawis ask, "What did the British do for us?" There is little recognition of the UK's effort, although I am told that much of what we see in Basra has been done by the British. We have not got the credit for our effort.
	Because we had no clear strategy at that period apart from the reduction of troop numbers, we lost out to JAM. By 2006 it was JAM's laws that counted, not what the British or the Iraqi Government had to say. For example, a hospital director in Basra tells the story of a male and a female doctor who were chatting. They continued chatting as they went out into the street, just by the gate. Someone from JAM ran out and fined the man for talking to a woman to whom he was not married and who was not a relative. The following week the same thing happened, but the fine doubled. The hospital director still asks how we could have allowed JAM's law to take over.
	We were unable to keep control over Amarah. By August we had retreated, but that was okay because we were handing over to the Iraqi army. The base that we had left was looted by the militias. As one very senior British officer put it, there was only one serious attempt to produce a counter-insurgency plan. That was General Richard Sheriff's Operation Sinbad in late 2006. Sinbad was a brave attempt to take control of the city, but when in December 2006 the then Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Des Browne) returned to England after having been out there and being briefed on it, he is reported to have been extremely angry that the ground truth had not been getting through about the seriousness of the situation in southern Iraq and specifically in Basra.
	The truth of Sinbad was that General Sheriff did not have the resources that he needed or Iraqi political top cover, and the Iraqi 10th Division stationed in Basra was not ready to do the job. Sinbad failed to deal with JAM, and from that point we started to spin the situation differently—it was no longer a question of insurgency. The Government made it clear that there would be no long-term resources of the kind needed for a proper counter-insurgency operation, so the line was that it was a matter of criminality, that the militias were just common criminals, that there was no political motivation to the militias' actions and that we were dealing with Palermo, not Beirut. We said that it was a police problem, not an army problem, and certainly not a problem for a foreign Army like ours.
	At about the same time, the US was putting lives and money on the line. After Sinbad, we made some serious attempts to capture and kill the JAM leadership in the first half of 2007. The problem, yet again, was that that was not part of a plan. We could take things, but we could not hold anything or build anything. By this point, 90 per cent. of the violence was directed at us. Why? Because we were the only people who were challenging the militia for control of the city. The casualty rate had reached such a level that when there was an opportunity to make an accommodation with JAM, we took it because we had to.
	The deal was that JAM would stop killing British soldiers, if we released a load of prisoners and withdrew our forces into the airport. Suddenly, behold, peace reigned, but not for the people of Basra. JAM was in undisputed control, and its law was in force—extortion, smuggling, murder and rape. The funds from JAM's control of Basra went to pay for the insurgency in Sadr City and elsewhere in the Shi'a uprising across Iraq.
	In fairness, that was probably a sensible decision at the time, because we were losing a lot of troops and reconciliation seemed an obvious thing to do. But in retrospect, what have we done? Far from handing over Basra to the Iraqi authorities, as the Secretary of State said earlier, we handed it over to a murderous militia. There is a view, with which I have some sympathy, that if the people of Basra had not gone through that ghastly experience, they would not have welcomed the Iraqi Government as they did after Operation Charge of the Knights. That is a view.

Harry Cohen: I hear the hon. Gentleman's point, and I will give my version of it if I catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I want to put something to the hon. Gentleman. "Newsnight" did a poll—at the end of 2007, I think—that said that more than 80 per cent. of people in Basra did not want the British there. Does that not form part of the hon. Gentleman's view?

Adam Holloway: It is tragic. I was in Iraq in the first war as a soldier and in the second war as a television correspondent. I shall never forget being in Kirkuk as the Iraqi Government were falling. Very few European people were around, and I was literally mobbed by people. This guy who was in the process of looting two incubators from the hospital came up and hugged me because people were so happy and they wanted to thank anybody European. Later, however, there were the sorts of polls that the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Harry Cohen) has mentioned; I thank him for his intervention.
	Not only the Iraqi people were fed up with us by that point. By March-April 2008, the Iraqi Government in Baghdad were fed up with the situation in Basra and believed it to be the fault of the British. As they saw it, we were sitting down at Basra airport in testudo—a tortoise formation—as if we were Roman soldiers with our shields around us. In fairness, I should say that the provincial reconstruction team was still doing its job and that we were still training the Iraqi army. However, our accommodation with the militia and, again, our lack of any clear purpose, prevented us from operating in the city.
	It was clear to the Iraqi Government and the insurgents that, at that point, the main British strategy was that there should be no further loss of British life. The Iraqi Government became so impatient with us that on Monday 24 March, Prime Minister al-Maliki personally came to Basra to sort out the problem. My understanding is that no reference was made to the British before he came, although I think that he mentioned it to the Americans—who were not keen, by the way, because at the time they were trying to sort out al-Qaeda in Mosul. Essentially, the initiative was an Iraqi one.
	On Tuesday 25 March, Operation Charge of the Knights was launched. Contrary to what the Secretary of State said, UK troops remained at the airport. By Friday, the US deputy core commander had come down to Basra and essentially taken control from the British—speak to the guys who were there. He brought with him Predators, Apaches, more Iraqi troops and firepower. Belatedly, UK military transition teams did give support—it was the 10th Division, I think. I am told that it was marvellous to see how our troops really got their act together and supported when they were given a part. However, it is simply disingenuous to suggest that Operation Charge of the Knights was, after the initial hiccup that has been mentioned, a joint thing.
	By June, Amarah had been won back, but not by us; Prime Minister al-Maliki saw us as pretty irrelevant. He blamed us for the accommodation with JAM—although he might have been being disingenuous, because another British general swears blind that al-Maliki's office was consulted about the accommodation before it happened. However, the bottom line was that al-Maliki felt that he was there to clear up the British mess, and that has shaped the UK-Iraqi relationship ever since. Although in Basra there is great respect for British troops, in Baghdad things were not the same because of the lack of any policy or strategy from the top. All along, all the British Government wanted was to get our troops out of Iraq.
	Now—guess what?—the Iraqi Government are very enthusiastic to help us with that agenda. The status of forces agreement that will get us out of Iraq will leave us with fewer than 400 military personnel there. The Prime Minister will get the laurels for getting us out of Iraq, and Prime Minister al-Maliki can claim that he kicked the British out and that there is no further need for British forces in Basra. So from 30 June, apart from the people at our large embassy and in the provincial reconstruction teams, we will have only these servicemen and women: those at the naval training team at Umm Qasr, those training officer cadets at "Sandhurst in the sand"—al-Rustamiyah—and logistics and other advisers in the Iraqi MOD. That is down from nearly 5,000 personnel. We will also lose the deputy commanding generals in the multinational force and the multinational corps.
	Since 2002, no one has really articulated our strategic relationship with Iraq. What is it? Despite all the good words over the years, it has always seemed as though the stories that we were told about what was happening on the ground were geared towards only one thing—getting us out of Iraq and away from the decision made by Tony Blair in Crawford. Right now, it seems that our strategy is to get out of Iraq before a UK general election, thereby removing a rather awkward election issue. While I agree that it is high time that we left, the manner of our departure and our conduct over the past five years sacrifices a strategic relationship with the second-biggest oil producer in the world and a people who, despite everything that has happened, still hold us in high regard and with great affection.
	The minuscule footprint that we are leaving behind does not include our highly successful mentoring role over the Iraqi armed forces. We are blowing an opportunity for an Oman-like loan service arrangement. In fairness, the Secretary of State said that the Basra Development Commission, under Sir Michael Wareing, is going well, but will British contracts be so welcomed, relevant or assured without British troops there? As my right hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot) said, others will seem to reap the benefits. Then, of course, our many friends in the Gulf remain nervous of Iraq and its history. We now have a great opportunity to try to break down that mistrust and set up Iraq as a bulwark against Iran's continued export of terror.
	The Government's narrative is that the job is done in southern Iraq, but they choose to ignore some of the worrying reports of evolving terror networks, of which the Minister will be aware. Our troops and commanders on the ground have indeed done an extraordinary job. The trouble, throughout, has been a lack of strategy from London. Since our strategy was only ever to get out, we are left with nothing apart from a rather damaged reputation. We have no serious strategy for Iraq, we have no serious strategy for Afghanistan either, and we have no serious strategy for winning the war on terror that I, like everyone else in this House, am quite keen to win.
	The truth is that Iraq remains a disaster for the United Kingdom, whatever the long-term benefits to the Iraqi people. As well as all those lives lost, the decision made at that ranch in Texas has acted only as a massive driver of radicalisation across the Muslim world. We are not leaving Iraq or Basra with the job done; we are leaving Iraq with the job made very much harder.

Harry Cohen: This is an opportunity to voice a parliamentary verdict on the excursion into Iraq. The Archbishop of Canterbury, in his modest way, called the Iraq war "wrong". It was more than that—it was illegal. The whole idea of regime change is illegal under international law. It was said by very many international jurists and experts that it was illegal. Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, described it as illegal. It was also amoral—it was mass murder for a huge robbery.
	During the current recession and the banking crisis, we have heard the phrase, "Small crooks rob banks and large ones own them." The really big boys—the US corporate gangsters—steal countries, and that was the intention in Iraq and how the occupation was pursued. It brought about the deaths of more than 1 million Iraqis, and the deaths of 178 British troops and more than 4,000 US troops, as well as many others, on top of a further 1 million who died in the 10 years leading up to the war on account of sanctions. Five million Iraqi refugees were forced to flee their homes. It was and remains a humanitarian catastrophe.
	This time last year, there was a World Health Organisation conference in Geneva, at which it was reported that the Iraqi Government estimated that 70 per cent. of critically injured people die due to the shortage of competent staff, lack of drugs and equipment. The Iraqi Medical Association and Medact said that Iraq did not have a functioning and reliable health service. The situation was so bad that scissors and needles were the only equipment that some hospitals had. There were no chairs or paper, and hospitals were left to decay. There was a lack of ambulances, with stretchers made from cloth and a shortage of medication. Medical training was non-existent or insufficient. Electrical supply to hospitals averaged an hour a day, and could come and go at any time. Access to a hospital or a doctor was a huge problem because there was no security. It was the Iraqi Medical Association that pointed that out.
	Oxfam has said that 4 million people regularly cannot buy enough to eat, and 70 per cent. are without adequate water supplies, up from 50 per cent. in 2003 when we went in. Some 28 per cent. of children have malnutrition, up from 19 per cent. when we went in. Because of the climate of fear and the trauma that they have endured, 92 per cent. of children suffer learning problems. Oxfam has also said that there has been a global apathy about all of this, and nowhere more so than in the occupying countries.
	Human rights abuses have reached a new low. An e-mail came today from Human Rights Watch, the United States organisation, which has just published its 2009 world report. It is worth quoting two bits from it:
	"The incoming Obama administration will need to put human rights at the heart of foreign, domestic, and security policy if it is to undo the enormous damage of the Bush years";
	and Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch says:
	"For the first time in nearly a decade, the US has a chance to regain its global credibility by turning the page on the abusive policies of the Bush administration...And not a moment too late."
	We have reached a new low: Guantanamo Bay, Haditha, Abu Ghraib, Falluja, extraordinary rendition, phosphorous bombs. All that is damaging to us because our credibility in arguing for high standards of human rights around the world, which are very much needed, has been shattered—shot to ribbons.
	It has been costly. The hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey) referred to the winner of the Nobel prize for economics, Joseph Stiglitz, and his book, "The Three Trillion Dollar War". I have here a review of this book in  Tribune, which says:
	"Consider just a sprinkling of the Stiglitz-Bilmes catalogues of cost as they attempt to break down the Three Trillion Dollar War: The US spends $16 billion every month on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—on top of 'regular' defence spending; By the year 2017, the American taxpayer will have to finance $1 trillion in interest payments alone to cover the cost of borrowing that money; The total bill for the US will be—and the authors insist that this is, deliberately, a conservative estimate—at least $3 trillion; They add that the rest of the world, including Britain, will probably have to find about the same amount again to cope with their own losses."
	We will be paying the interest on the debt caused by it. The Liberal spokesman mentioned a figure of £20 billion, but I suspect that it will be more than that.
	The situation has damaged UK armed forces. I have served on the Defence Committee, and I have a lot of time and support for members of our armed forces. The majority of them are very brave, but I do not go along with the bluster that we hear in the Chamber about their being the best in the world. They have often been exposed in Iraq as impotent, and too often as venal, as in the cases of Baha Mousa, Camp Breadbasket and the killings at Amarah of people who had been captured.
	More seriously, when the Labour Government came to power—again, I refer to my time on the Defence Committee—we were told that our forces would be a force for good. That idea is in the same bin as the ethical foreign policy because of what has happened in Iraq, which is damaging to UK armed forces. The UK has been an active partner in the US ruling coalition.

Harry Cohen: The hon. Gentleman has misinterpreted my point. I pointed out the quality of the troops, but they have to do the job that the Government and Parliament tell them to do, which has been a disgraceful job. In that sense, they have become not a force for good in Iraq but the opposite of that, given the catalogue of cases that I mentioned.
	The UK has been an active partner in the ruling coalition, but it has tried to evade its guilt for complicity in the atrocities of the war and the occupation. Repeatedly, Ministers have answered parliamentary questions by saying, "The US answers for what the US does. Nothing to do with us." But the UK was up to its neck in the policy and the atrocities that followed from it, including the disbandment of the Iraqi Administration under the guise of de-Ba'athification. Many other appalling things also happened as a result of decisions that we made and things that we approved.
	I always like to bring a bit of culture to the House, so I wish to quote a man who died recently, Harold Pinter, our Nobel prize winner for literature. He said in his speech when he accepted the prize:
	"We have brought torture, cluster bombs, depleted uranium, innumerable acts of random murder, misery, degradation and death to the Iraqi people and call it 'bringing freedom and democracy to the Middle East'."
	He said:
	"As every single person here knows, the justification for the invasion of Iraq was that Saddam Hussein possessed a highly dangerous body of weapons of mass destruction, some of which could be fired in 45 minutes, bringing about appalling devastation. We were assured that was true. It was not true. We were told that Iraq had a relationship with al-Qaeda and shared responsibility for the atrocity in New York of 11 September 2001. We were assured that this was true. It was not true. We were told that Iraq threatened the security of the world. We were assured it was true. It was not true.
	The truth is something entirely different. The truth is to do with how the United States understands its role in the world and how it chooses to embody it.
	But my contention here is that the US crimes in the same period have only been superficially recorded, let alone documented, let alone acknowledged, let alone recognised as crimes at all.
	The crimes of the United States have been systematic, constant, vicious, remorseless, but very few people have actually talked about them. You have to hand it to America. It has exercised a quite clinical manipulation of power worldwide while masquerading as a force for universal good. It's a brilliant, even witty, highly successful act of hypnosis."
	That is what Harold Pinter said in his acceptance speech.
	I also want to read a poem of Harold Pinter's, called "God Bless America":
	"Here they go again,
	The Yanks in their armoured parade
	Chanting their ballads of joy
	As they gallop across the big world
	Praising America's God.
	The gutters are clogged with the dead
	The ones who couldn't join in
	The others refusing to sing
	The ones who are losing their voice
	The ones who've forgotten the tune.
	The riders have whips which cut.
	Your head rolls onto the sand
	Your head is a pool in the dirt
	Your head is a stain in the dust
	Your eyes have gone out and your nose
	Sniffs only the pong of the dead
	And all the dead air is alive
	With the smell of America's God."
	Harold Pinter—worth quoting in the House. We were a coalition partner, who rode along with such policies.
	I want to put a few things on the record. On 22 December, the brave journalist, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, wrote in  The Independent:
	"So to the Iraqis, the beneficiaries of our noble 'sacrifices'. This week, Nahla Hussein, a left-wing, feminist Kurdish Iraqi was shot and beheaded for her campaigning zeal. Fifty-seven Iraqis were blown up in Kirkuk. Christians in Mosul are being savagely persecuted and sharia law has replaced the 1959 codified entitlements given to women in family disputes. Women in Iraq have fewer rights today than under Saddam. Yes, there is some normality in parts but tensions between Shias and Sunnis are explosive. When troops are withdrawn next year, expect more bloodshed. The resources of Iraq, meanwhile, are being plundered.
	For these blessings, one million Iraqis had to die and their children still suffer from illnesses caused by our weapons and our war. Five million Iraqis are displaced and, of these, the US took in 1,700. It is easier for an Iraqi cat or dog to gain entry to the land of the free... we took in 300"—
	against a refugee count of 5 million. That shows a lack of commitment, which Oxfam pointed out.
	We were not the second biggest army in Iraqi. Private mercenaries comprised the second biggest army by far. They immediately had immunity under the Bremer arrangements, which we supported, from the law and prosecution. A briefing from War on Want contains a heading, "UK companies are making a killing". Some have Members on their boards. Those companies have contracts worth hundreds of millions of pounds.
	I want to put on the record the way in which the mercenaries operate. On 19 December,  Tribune included a review of "Big Boy Rules: America's Mercenaries Fighting in Iraq", a book by Steve Fainaru. It states:
	"This moving book reveals the human cost of Bush and Blair's illegal war in Iraq. Written by Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Steve Fainaru of the  Washington Post, it follows a group of mercenaries, mainly American, as they roam across a war-torn country immune to any laws of decency, fighting a war by proxy and for profit.
	As well as defining the 'fight, survive, get paid' rules under which they operate, he describes the corruption and moral bankruptcy of the American-led, British-supported policies of so-called 'reconstruction'. So-called because it is palpably clear the outcome is to line the pockets of the mercenaries—and the American corporations which employ them—at the expense of the Iraqis."
	The article continues:
	"Iraq has proved a magnet for those war-like men from around the world, including Americans, Brits, Aussies, Kiwis, Fijians, South Africans, Peruvians, Chileans and many more, who find fulfilment at the end of a loaded weapon aimed at a fellow human being. Cover-ups are the norm in the shoot first and, if you can be bothered, ask questions later culture of this murky yet officially sanctioned world.
	How can people sink to such levels of barbarity? And what does this say for the governments who condone their actions by employing them? There's sadness, too, that Iraq, anxious for change after Saddam Hussein, was condemned to the chaos and pillage of these licensed bandits."
	The militias of the various Iraqi groups mirror those mercenaries. Some are run by the Iraqi Government. Many, for example, the facilities protection service, which has killed ordinary Iraqis, do the same job as the mercenaries.

Harry Cohen: I shall do that; the point is made. The oil robbery is another part of it, with UK-US companies having a monopoly, conferring massively advantageous deals to export profits from Iraq for years to come.
	I will conclude. There is exhaustion at the killing in Iraq: that is why it has slowed down, but the occupation continues. I think that many of the mercenaries will stay, US forces will certainly stay and even some of our special forces will stay, although most will move on to the next war in Afghanistan or possibly Iran. The opposition in Iraq will, however, continue. People will want their country and their own resources back. It has not been a victory in the sense of getting a decent job done. It has been a defeat and a failure—a country devastated and a people made much poorer, the infrastructure destroyed and resources stolen. Our opponents everywhere have been strengthened by that failure. Iran certainly has. The risk to us has been increased enormously. We need to get out totally.
	I come to my final point. Yesterday saw the final press conference of President Bush, who said that
	"even in the darkest days of Iraq... we had fun".
	What a swine!

James Gray: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. That is, of course, a matter for the record. I did not say that I voted against the war, but it was clever of him to pick it up. It was a three-line Whip, and the Whips persuaded me that unless I was going to resign from the Front Bench, it would not be possible for me to vote against the war. A number of my colleagues who were strongly opposed to it resigned their posts, but I accepted the Queen's shilling and continued on the Front Bench. However, I did abstain and wrote, as I think my hon. Friend the Member for North Essex will confirm, an extremely strongly worded internal memo within the Conservative party seeking to persuade it not to support the Government. My record on that is fairly clear.
	However, that is ancient history. I mentioned it to make the point that despite that fundamental opposition to the war, I am one of those who would agree with most hon. Members who have spoken in saying that getting rid of the vile dictator Saddam Hussein is of course greatly to the benefit both of the people of Iraq and of the people of the world. There is no question about it: the Iraq that we have today is vastly better than the Iraq we had 10 years ago. I am still not convinced that what we did was justifiable under international law, but the end result is much better than the situation we had then. I hope that people will not think that that is a case of winning both sides of the argument. I do not think we had the justification to go in, but none the less my suspicion is that the end result is better than the end result we would have had had we not gone in, if that is not too Irish.
	The debate is not about why we went into Iraq; it is about the future strategic relationship with Iraq. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) asked an interesting question of the Secretary of State—namely, are we talking about our military connection with Iraq in the future? If that is the case, it is fairly obvious that we do not have one, with the exception of 300 or 400 advisers, naval and military personnel and so on. I suspect that the purpose of the debate is to consider where we see Iraq coming into our strategy with regard to the rest of the world, and I shall return to that matter.
	There are three pitfalls into which we should not allow ourselves to fall, although a number of hon. Members did fall into them. The first pitfall, which the Secretary of State fell into to a degree, is to stand up and say, "Didn't we do a fine job in Iraq? Job done. Now we must leave." One of the finest speeches that I have heard, certainly in this debate and for quite a long time in the Chamber, was by my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham (Mr. Holloway), who exploded that easy conclusion. His chronology of the conflict in Iraq over the past five years exploded the notion that what we did was right, that it was a brilliant campaign for five years, and that we can now pack ourselves on the back and say, "Job well done. Now we can leave Iraq. Thank goodness for that." That notion is entirely wrong. It is not a job well done. An awful lot of fundamental mistakes have been made, and some of the things that we are leaving behind in Iraq are significantly worse than they would have been had we handled events differently. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend and hope that if people read nothing else from this debate, they read his speech, which is worthy of a wider audience. It summed up the problems going forward in Iraq.

Richard Bacon: I share my hon. Friend's admiration for the speech of the my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham (Mr. Holloway). My hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) said he thought that things were undoubtedly better in Iraq as a result of the military intervention. Does he think that they are better for women, or worse? Does he think that they are better for Christians, or worse?

Tobias Ellwood: It is a pleasure to participate in this important debate, and may I echo the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) on our concerns about the absence of an inquiry? I agree with him that the reasons for an inquiry were illustrated with great enthusiasm and in great detail by my hon.—and gallant—Friend the Member for Gravesham (Mr. Holloway). If anyone reads the  Hansard record of this debate, they will find that his contribution provides a fantastically good chronology of all the key issues—which, incidentally, were not covered by the Prime Minister in his statement in December, and which certainly were not touched upon in the Secretary of State's opening remarks. My hon. Friend explained precisely why we need to go into detail and understand a little more about what has been happening in respect of our military and various Whitehall Departments in Iraq over the past five or six years.
	This debate is a poor substitute for a full inquiry into the Iraq war—a war that has cost us £7 billion and almost 200 British lives. I agree with those Members who said that we were very pleased with the situation in Iraq now, but the big question is why has it taken us so long to get to this position where we can almost pause and take stock and say, "We are pleased with where Iraq has got to"? We could have been in this position much earlier if we had gone into Iraq with more of a plan than we had in March 2003. It is hard for me to say this, as I am one of the service personnel who has served in a number of operational environments and was part of the regiment that retreated from Basra palace to the airport, but in my view Britain has been humiliated by operations in Iraq. Not since Suez should we hang our heads in such shame, and scratch our heads and ask what went wrong. This is a political failure, not a military one, however. We cut our troop numbers too fast, we reconstructed too slowly and we eventually lost control completely.
	As we have heard, we had responsibility for Basra and the surrounding regions in southern Iraq: Operation Telic and the Multi-National Division (South-East). Basra should have been an easy area for us to take control of and to start to develop once the initial level of security was maintained. The area was no friend of Saddam because of its isolation after the uprisings following Operation Desert Storm. There was euphoria when Saddam was toppled, but that was short-lived and security became very fragile until it eventually disappeared completely and was replaced by a vacuum. That is why I was astonished to hear the Secretary of State say in his opening remarks how pleased he was that we had extinguished al-Qaeda in Iraq. It was not there in the first place; for us to pat ourselves on the back and say, "Well done," is completely wrong, because we allowed it to step in and take advantage of the absence of any security in the first place.
	Of course, when there is no plan, individuals take it upon themselves to rule themselves. Looting began, petty crime increased, gangs formed and eventually the enemy, including al-Qaeda, was able to reorganise and move into Iraq as a whole. Eventually, these gangs formed into militias, mostly according to ethnic groupings, and that led to the formation of the great Mahdi army.
	We should listen to some of the voices on such matters. General Sir Michael Jackson has been quoted many times in this House. He made it very clear that
	"the taking of Basra city by 7 Armoured Brigade was a brilliant operation".
	All of us should pay tribute to that operation and the skill and brilliance of our troops. However, he then goes on to say that there was a fundamental
	"lack of a coherent reconstruction plan".
	When I spoke to some Department for International Development civil servants, I was astonished to hear that in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, a message went round from the then Secretary of State for International Development telling all directors not to do any planning whatever because they were not even sure whether the war was legal. This was at the same time as the Ministry of Defence was moving in up to 40,000 troops—many of whom were already in the theatre of operations in any case—so clearly there was not any thought about what to do once our military had moved into position.
	The Ministry of Defence has recently produced a thick glossy document, "UK Defence", which goes through all aspects of our military campaigns. Page 70, which refers to Operation Telic five years on, states:
	"The campaign since March 2003 has proved to be one of the most complex and challenging ever undertaken by the British armed forces."
	The former Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary have both said that mistakes were made in British conduct in the aftermath of the initial fighting. That shows how important it is to have an inquiry. Five years on, we can see what our armed forces have been doing. Until recently, they were involved in intense fire fights, benign patrolling and low-key reconstruction projects, funded mostly by the United States, not the British.
	There have been important successes. There has been a referendum on the new constitution and there have been subsequent elections. Most importantly, we have avoided civil war, which I was concerned about. I say that with caution, because, as I said earlier in an intervention, regional elections have been deliberately delayed by the central Iraqi Government because of worry about where they might lead if people vote for ethnic alliances, with polarisation of the electorate, perhaps leading to more instability and then conflict. That is a concern, and we must monitor the situation very carefully.
	Those huge failures all point to Great Britain's inability to conduct post-conflict operations, and Whitehall's lack of organisational ability to deal with the cross-over between political and military situations. It was sad to hear the Defence Secretary paint such a rosy and positive picture of our retreat from Iraq. It is not positive, and there is huge frustration in the military that the job could have been done so much better had there been more support from Whitehall. The euphoria of 7th Armoured Brigade when it went into Basra back in March 2003 disappeared after the summer of 2007 with the withdrawal from Basra palace to the airport by my regiment, the 4th Battalion the Rifles. That has been discussed again and again in this debate.
	Prime Minister al-Maliki said of the withdrawal from Basra palace to the airport that
	"Basra has been left to the mercy of Militia men."
	Whose decision was it to make that retreat? It was probably a wise decision at the time because, by then, we had become part of the problem. If it was the right call, as the Government say, why was it necessary to have the huge operation—the Charge of the Knights—in March 2008, to which reference has been made repeatedly during the debate?
	Basra is controlled not by Britain, but by the Iranian-backed militia. Without sufficient forces and political will, the UK was sidelined. Three thousand US marines took part in the operation, and Britain played catch-up. I am sorry that we have been almost misled in the House and that our role in that operation has been built up. We did not do ourselves justice. We were late in becoming involved in the battle, and it was the US—with, I believe, the 14th Iraqi Division—who supported the Iraqi 10th Division. Prime Minister al-Maliki referred to that in his statement. It was misleading for the House to be given the impression that things were going so well, and it is sad that the Defence Secretary has not provided a more accurate picture.
	Given that we try so hard to sit at the world's top table and given all our nuclear weapons, a place on the Security Council and a century of war-fighting experience, it is amazing that we could not even hold a medium-sized conurbation. Right now, we are huddled in Basra airport in an overwatch role. During my long time in the armed forces, I never heard what an overwatch role is. I am afraid that our prestige has been damaged, and we have been replaced not by Iraqi soldiers, but by US soldiers. They are now training the police, mentoring the border guards and teaming up with the Iraqi army. We cannot say that our job is complete when we are not handing over to the people who we went to Iraq to help in the first place.
	That prompts the question of what our objective is. Is it to deploy troops to southern Iraq and spend £7 billion only to hand over to the US forces? That cannot be right. How can the Prime Minister dare to say that our task in Iraq has been achieved? As I have said, how can we congratulate ourselves on removing al-Qaeda from Iraq when it was not there in the first place?
	I have made the case for a full inquiry and I believe that that case has never been more convincing. Serious questions remain, in my view, about the interpretation of the intelligence that justified the invasion in the first place. My hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham talked about how plans were being considered before and during 2002 before troops went anywhere near Kuwait or the surrounding countries. In fact, I can tell him that General Franks, who was in charge of US Central Command at the time, received a call from President Bush, through Rumsfeld, in November 2001, just after the invasion of Afghanistan, to say, "Please can you look at your invasion plans for Iraq?" That was in November 2001. It was the first call I saw in which the invasion of that country was being considered.
	The UK's clear failure to manage the peace is very worrying, as is the absence of a UK plan for reconstruction and of coherent leadership from Whitehall. In 2003, following the invasion, we had no plan, no strategy and no idea. We did not know how to harness the euphoria after the fall of Saddam and to sow the seeds of governance. Without a plan, nothing really happens, and we went from being liberators to being occupiers. Where was the army of civil servants, linguists, engineers, planners, trainers and local governance experts? Where were the people who could come in behind the British military, start dealing with all those issues and start nation building?
	We have heard about the importance of Umm Qasr, the deep water port. Why was not energy put into getting that port working? We are talking about it now, but it should have happened in the important first 100 days, when hostilities had ceased. Likewise, the bridge that is now being planned over the Shatt al-Arab waterway should have been built straight away. Those high-profile events would have shown the locals that we meant business and wanted to help them, and we would have been seen not as occupiers but as liberators.
	We did not harness local talents. The fundamental difference between Iraq and Afghanistan was the wealth of experience and talent in the country in the first place, which was completely ignored. It goes back to the most fundamental schoolboy error of the war, made by either Jerry Bremer or Bush, which was the dissolution of the Iraqi army on 23 May 2003 and, just a week before, the outlawing of membership of the Ba'ath party. That immediately alienated 40,000 teachers and as many nurses and doctors who had no choice but to participate in the party, because it was the only way in which they could move forward. Why did not Britain oppose that decision? Why did Britain not question the logic of getting rid of the basic army and having to start all over again?
	There are many lessons to be learned from Iraq that could prevent the mistakes from being repeated in Afghanistan. Our failure to take advantage of the fragile umbrella of security, to win over hearts and minds and to push forward development has resulted in Afghanistan in a second surge taking place in Helmand province, involving 20,000 troops in an area for which we are supposed to have responsibility.
	There are many lessons to be learned about the entire process of what has been called the "awakening", involving the funding of militias in Anbar province. That has not really been done in modern warfare and modern development and the jury is out about whether it works. Yet again, there are lessons to be learned. The same sort of initiatives are being considered by General Petraeus for Afghanistan, but all those opportunities are being lost because we have not learned from the discussion resulting from a proper inquiry.
	We do not have proper stabilisation capability—such a thing is absent from the British mindset. We need to take a thorough look at the relationship between the MOD and DFID. At present, DFID spending, over all operations, is just 1 per cent. of military spending. That is completely wrong if we are to win over hearts and minds in the crucial 100-day period to which my hon. Friend the Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) referred. As I think he said, DFID does not do danger, but it does some things very well indeed, such as tackling poverty. There has been a revolution in military warfare—from a cold war to a counter-insurgency stance—but we have not seen the same revolution in reconstruction and development. Britain is behind in that area, which is why I propose that we move a slice of money from DFID's £5.6 billion budget to the MOD and create a new stabilisation force of brigade capability that is able to start doing important reconstruction tasks in that initial two or three-month period. When things have been seen to move forward, the force could hand over to contractors, non-governmental organisations and the DFIDs and USAIDs of this world. Until that happens, there will be vacuums in Iraq and Afghanistan.
	We regularly pay tribute to the commitment and professionalism of our armed forces and the sacrifice they make for our country, but in the long history of our military engagements Iraq was far from our finest hour. That was no fault of our armed forces; blame is firmly on the shoulders of Whitehall, which failed to plan for peace. Consequently, the UK's reputation as a reliable and competent country, willing to step forward when others are unable or unwilling to do so, has suffered. An inquiry into the war in Iraq will show that the fault was not in the way our military fought the war, but the incompetence of the Government in managing the peace. For that reason, the Government continue to find excuses to delay that important review of what went wrong. It is no wonder that we are repeating many of the same mistakes in Afghanistan. It is shameful that the Government do not take responsibility for their actions and acknowledge the shortfall in Britain's post-conflict capability.

Andrew Pelling: Whatever our discussions about how affairs in Iraq have progressed, it is important—as the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood) has said—that the message is sent that we give our heartfelt thanks to the Army and their families for all their sacrifices serving our country and for trying their best to serve the people of Iraq. I was struck by the hon. Gentleman's speech and by those of the hon. Members for Gravesham (Mr. Holloway) and for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) in terms of their frank and direct analysis of the unfortunate debacle that has been Iraq.
	It is important for us to look forward, however, at how the strategic interests of the UK and our strategic relationship with Iraq can progress in the interests of all. It is certainly a pleasure for me to speak after so many Members who have real expertise on the ground in Iraq. My particular interest is that there is a large Kurdish community in my constituency and recently, unfortunately, Christian refugees from Iraq have come to Croydon.
	Our current departure from Iraq is not the first time we have left the region with many issues unresolved and with difficult choices facing the Government as to how such issues can be pursued in the interests of all. We all know that there is continuing unhappiness about the promises made by our Government, and indeed by the League of Nations, to Assyrians and Kurds, as a result of the settlements after the first world war.
	Perhaps we can take some confidence from the fact that our country's involvement in both the first Iraqi conflict in the 1990s, and the more recent Iraqi conflict, has left Kurdish areas with a strong sense of autonomy. It was perhaps the sensible and wise decision of John Major and our allies to impose a no-fly zone over Kurdish areas that has allowed that area relative prosperity and autonomy. I have, over the years, enjoyed meeting members of the Kurdish Parliament who have visited the UK. It will be interesting to hear what expectations the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the hon. Member for Harlow (Bill Rammell) has for the continuing relative autonomy of that area when we and the Americans have left.
	I know that the Minister is concerned about the issue of Christian minorities in Iraq, and that he met a number of representatives from Christian communities just before Lord Alton held a meeting in the House of Lords on the subject. I attended Lord Alton's meeting. It is interesting, historically, that Aramaic, the language of Jesus, is still spoken in northern Iraq. Disturbingly, 150,000 Christian refugees find themselves outside Iraq after the many murders and pogroms that took place last autumn. In the context of the strategic progression of our relationship with Iraq, I would be interested to hear what possible solutions the Minister sees to that continuing problem.
	It is not fashionable to express concern about the persecution of Christian minorities, but this is a real, serious concern, and I know that the Government take it seriously. It strikes me that there are three options to pursue, all of which may be difficult for the Government to face. The first is to take the approach that was taken towards the Ugandan Asians—that is, to take the view that we should be far more liberal in allowing Christian refugees to leave the middle east and come to the United Kingdom. Another approach is to be realistic and take the view that the Kurdistan regional government has a role in protecting any Christians who might choose to return. In reality, probably half the Christian population of northern Iraq has now left the country. There are also those Christian communities that left northern Iraq in the 1980s. The situation depends on our ability to influence the Iraqi Government, either by ourselves or through the Americans, to give proper reassurance that land that was taken from those groups in the 1980s will be returned.
	There are a number of other minorities. One group in particular, in northern Iraq, also needs consideration—the Mandaeans, 80 per cent. of whom have already left Iraq. Clearly, consideration needs to be given to them. Another minority that has suffered greatly in Iraq for a number of decades is the Faili Kurds, who come from south and central Iraq. They were forced by Saddam Hussein to march in front of the front line during the conflict with Iran, even though they were enemies of the state. They were slaughtered by Iranian fire—it is a very sad story. Perhaps, as we depart from Iraq, we can find a solution that allows their return to Kurdistan.
	Important issues have been raised in this debate, and I know that the Minister will find it hard to answer the many questions that have been posed. It would be interesting to know what the Government think will happen when our American allies also leave. What is the risk of civil war? What can we do in the short and medium term to influence the American Government to influence the Government in Baghdad to deal with the concerns raised in the debate by the shadow Secretary of State for Defence? The shadow Secretary of State expressed his concern that the upcoming local elections could be abused and freedom could be restricted by direction from central Government.
	We have an interest in continuing stability in northern Iraq and in Kurdistan. I know that it is not appropriate ever to give consideration to the creation of Kurdistan, even though that was an undertaking given by UK Governments at the beginning of the 20th century. It would be interesting to hear the Government's approach to continuing Turkish incursions into northern Iraq after the withdrawal of our troops and those of our allies from Iraq.
	Compared with all those concerns, business issues do not seem so important, but trade and prosperity ensure that peace can be more easily maintained in an area that will continue to suffer great instability. It is important to note that because of the relative autonomy of Kurdistan or Kurdish Iraq, despite all the recent troubles in Mosul and Kirkuk, there is greater prosperity there. Because the Kurds have had to live under many different regimes, countries and empires over the years, they are very good as a trading nation. I hope that the Government will continue to support the interests there.
	As the right hon. Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot) said, Iraq could and should be one of the richest countries in the world. It is, after all, the very cradle of modern civilisation. Let us hope that despite the debacles, the Government's good efforts to tackle the difficult issues that remain will deal effectively with the concerns raised by many hon. Members in the debate today.

David Lidington: The debate has been mostly thoughtful and, on occasions, passionate. I would draw out from it three themes which have been expressed by most contributors in all parts of the House. First, there has been pride in the courage and professionalism of our armed forces. Secondly, there has been regret at the enormous cost of the Iraq war and the subsequent violence, the deaths, the physical and mental scars, the refugees who have gone to neighbouring countries and the many displaced families within Iraq. Thirdly, throughout the debate there has been an expression of hope that Iraq can at last, after turmoil and suffering, look to a more stable and prosperous future. That hope has been coupled with a determination across party political boundaries in the House to help the people of Iraq meet the challenge of reconstructing their economy and society.
	There have been a number of noteworthy speeches. Everyone in the House enjoyed the contribution from the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Dr. Howells) relishing his new-won freedom, and the words of the right hon. Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd), who spoke with an acknowledged history of commitment and dedication to the welfare and rights of the ordinary people of Iraq that is unmatched in any part of the House.
	The hon. Member for Stockton, South (Ms Taylor) and my right hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot) made telling contrasts between the violent society that they had observed in Iraq just a couple of years ago and the more peaceful state of affairs that prevails today. As we all know, our troops will, in large part, be coming home in about six months. In that context, I want to raise one point that has not been alluded to so far. I ask the Minister to give a clear pledge that when the troops return we will not abandon any of the Iraqis who put at risk their lives and the safety of their families by working for the British armed forces or the British administrative authorities in Iraq. Those people deserve more than our thanks—if their lives are at risk on account of what they did on behalf of our forces or civilian staff, they deserve our sanctuary as well. I hope that the Minister will be able to guarantee that the cases still being considered will have been properly and fairly decided by the time the troops pull out and that the Government will have arrangements in place to deal properly, fairly and sympathetically with any new cases that come to light after July this year.
	The main point of disagreement in what has been a considerably consensual debate has been about the case for an inquiry into the decision to go to war and into the subsequent conduct of the war. Various speeches, notably that of my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham (Mr. Holloway), but also that of my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood), have highlighted particular examples of when things went wrong and where it would be sensible, and good government, to learn and apply the lessons. We heard about the lack of a proper reconstruction plan and about the last-minute switch in the plans, when British forces deployed not in northern Iraq but in the southern provinces. We heard about the lack of adequate planning to ensure that reconstruction and development work was brought in swiftly in support of the Army. I cannot help adding that with hindsight it would have been helpful had there been at the time a Secretary of State for International Development who was interested in planning to work in support of the armed services. The Prime Minister of the time carries a responsibility for not ensuring that his Ministers were acting in a properly co-ordinated fashion.
	We need an inquiry for two reasons. First, we must learn the lessons. Secondly, we must establish what, as is evident from this debate, is still lacking—a degree of consensus about the facts. As I contrast what my right hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hampshire said with what the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Harry Cohen) said, I find not only disagreement about how to interpret particular events, but profound disagreement about what actually happened. A serious inquiry by Privy Counsellors, with access to all the people and documents relevant to the decision to go to war and its subsequent conduct, would establish what happened with greater clarity.
	I was disappointed by the Secretary of State's comments on that point. For the most part, I agreed with his speech and thought it a high-quality contribution. However, he seemed to be saying that the time was not yet ripe for an inquiry and that the Prime Minister would take a decision in due course. The Government gave no hint about the criteria that they would use to decide when the time was finally right to hold such an inquiry. Will it be the end of July, when the bulk of the troops come home? Will it be after the 400 troops left to train Iraqis are withdrawn? Will there be a delay until the very last military adviser of any kind is finally brought home from Iraq? I have to say to the Secretary of State, in sorrow rather than in a spirit of outrage, that his response on this point did not do him justice. We heard the voice of the Secretary of State, but we got the words of the Prime Minister. We got secrecy, not openness, and in place of accountability, we got evasion. I reiterate to the House that if a Conservative Government are elected at the next general election, that inquiry will be held without any further delay.
	There is such a contrast between how the British Government have behaved and the conduct of the United States, where both the Executive and the legislature have commissioned successive inquiries to examine what went right and what went wrong and have then published and discussed their findings openly—and they have not been afraid of trenchant criticism coming out of those inquiries. Any Member of this House can go to the internet and read the draft report of the inspector general on Iraq. Let me quote a couple of examples of the sort of criticism in that report. The inspector general talks about the
	"poor integration of inter-agency efforts bred by weak unity of command and inconsistent unity of effort"
	and
	"the blinkered and disjointed pre-war planning for Iraqi reconstruction".
	Those are charges that have been levelled this afternoon, and during other debates in this House, about the United Kingdom's planning and preparation. Whether or not they are true, they should be examined by people who have access to all the relevant records.
	Rightly, however, the focus of the debate has been more on the future of Iraq than on its past. The future strategic relationship of this country and Iraq is important not only in terms of bilateral relations but in terms of our policy towards the region as a whole. For the most part, what has been said in the debate has been couched in terms of hope and optimism for the future. However, my hon. Friend the Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) gave us a cogent word of warning when he spoke of how in the past we sometimes promised things that, in the event, we were unable to deliver. We need to temper optimism with a hard-headed appraisal of the problems that face Iraq today and that will continue to face it in the foreseeable future.
	While the speech by the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead was largely over the top, he was right when he reminded us of the daily violence and intimidation that still takes place in Iraq. This week, the Pentagon submitted its latest quarterly progress report to the United States Congress. The report said that security incidents had reached their lowest level since systematic counting began in 2004. That is welcome, without any qualification. It said that inadequate supplies of food, water, electricity and health care had replaced security as the chief concern of Iraqi citizens. But it went on to say that
	"the underlying sources of instability in Iraq have yet to be resolved. Iraq remains fragile because its major power brokers do not share a unified national vision".
	In the run-up to the imminent regional elections, we see political tensions not only between the main ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, but within those groups as well. Once those elections are out of the way, there will be further political jostling ahead of the referendum planned for the summer on the United States' stationing of forces agreement, ahead of the national elections at the end of the 2009 and ahead of the decision on the future of Kirkuk.
	Political tension and rivalry in Iraq can lead to the abuse of human rights. I join the right hon. Member for Cynon Valley in urging the Government—I think that the Government will be happy to agree—to keep our attention on the human rights record in Iraq. We must maintain a dialogue with the Iraqi authorities in all parts of Iraq about human rights, and we need to ensure that the record of Iraq is examined, as those of other countries are, through the appropriate international bodies.
	The hon. Member for Croydon, Central (Mr. Pelling) and others were right to discuss the continuing persecution of some religious minorities. In recent weeks, I have met delegations from some of the Christian communities in Iraq, who have told me about the pressure that they have been under not just, as is commonly known, in Baghdad and Basra, but in areas of the Nineveh plain that are the traditional centres of Christian culture in that country. The smaller minorities, such as the Yazidis and the Sabbateans, have probably suffered even worse, with large proportions of those communities having given up and fled into exile.
	I turn to the challenge of Iraq's economy. As my hon. Friend the Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox) urged, the Government should give a higher priority to helping British business take advantage of the opportunities opening up in Iraq. I am getting rather tired of the fact that in every country that I visit in the middle east, I hear from the host Government something along the lines of, "Well, we'd like to work more with you British, but you've rather let the French, the Germans and the Italians steal a march on you in recent years." I hope that the Government will not let those economic opportunities for our country slip, given that our country has sacrificed a great deal in soldiers' lives and taxpayers' money to support the policy being pursued in Iraq.
	The extent to which Iraq makes a success of economic development is bound up with political stability in getting a proper rule of law introduced and observed throughout the country. Significantly, there has to be agreement on the sharing of petroleum revenues. It is dismaying to see that such an agreement has still not been reached, despite the fact that for several years the political parties in Baghdad have said that they had done a deal and were on the verge of introducing legislation. We still seem to have a stand-off between the Kurdish regional government and the central Government in Baghdad. Given that a number of oil industry experts believe that Iraq's reserves may even match those of Saudi Arabia, it is urgent that agreement is reached, and I hope that whatever diplomatic work Britain can do to facilitate that will be pursued.
	Finally, there is the question of Iraq's regional role. My hon. Friend the Member for Woodspring touched on its relationships with Iran, Syria, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. I hope that the Government will continue to encourage those of our friends in the Arab world who have not yet done so to station ambassadors permanently in Baghdad. Given Iraq's close links with the Iranian Government, it might be possible for her to help to provide Britain and the United States with a conduit for contact with the Iranian regime at a very senior level. I would be interested to hear the Government's view on that.
	In the longer term, it seems to me that if we are to get a stable arrangement for collective security in the middle east—something along the lines of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe has often been discussed—Iraq should play a key role in the effort. It is both proudly Arab and now friendly with Iran, and it could play an important part in creating a stable, more prosperous future. The hope and objective of our policy must be not just for Iraq to be sovereign, politically stable and prosperous, but for it to play a leading and constructive part in shaping a better future for the whole of that very troubled region.

Bill Rammell: When the hon. Gentleman describes our contribution as a humiliation, I do not think that he was describing the reality, and he did himself no credit. He asked why we did not get to the position we are in today sooner. It is because this has been an extraordinarily difficult situation—

Coastguard Services (Devon)

Paul Clark: I am interested in the hon. Gentleman's interpretation and the dictionary that he has used to determine the meaning of the word "pedals". In my dictionary, a pedal is described as a foot-operated lever used to control a vehicle or machine while pedalling is to propel a cycle using pedals. In my view, those descriptions cannot apply to Segways. However, at the meeting in November with representatives of the all-party intelligent transport group, my ministerial colleague the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, my hon. Friend the Member for Poplar and Canning Town (Jim Fitzpatrick) suggested that what is really needed, in the long term, is a Europe-wide view of what Segways are intended for and where they are permitted to be used. That is not clear at present. The machines are used and treated in legal terms in different ways not just in different countries but in different parts of those countries.
	Is the vehicle intended for use on the road? Is it intended for use on dedicated cycle tracks or pedestrian facilities, or for other uses? I note that today it has been suggested that cycle paths might be the way forward. It is germane that the European Commission is currently undertaking public consultation about the framework directive on two and three-wheeled vehicles and quadricycles. It is certainly relevant that one EU member state recently proposed to amend national legislation to permit Segway use on their roads. We are carefully watching the development of that proposal and the discussions about it, and it has been put on a six-month standstill.
	I recognise that there is potential, however. We are due to hold further discussions in the next few weeks, and we will look at the issues that arise. I note that the hon. Gentleman believes that the Segway and other machines may meet the requirements for electrically motorised pedal vehicles, but there is some doubt about whether that is the case, so we need dialogue—offers have been made, not to the hon. Gentleman but to the company—with officials and all concerned to look at the interpretation and consider the route forward.
	Section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 may offer a remote possibility, although I do not want to raise any hopes. The provision covers exemptions from certain requirements for the use of equipment, but it may not reduce the requirement for registration. However, if we can have clarity about the intended uses, there may be ways forward.
	In conclusion, the opportunity for the debate is very much welcomed—congratulations to the hon. Gentleman. The meeting that is due to take place in the next few weeks is a further step forward. We do not have a closed mind and shall take a balanced view of the opportunities.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 House adjourned .